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ABSTRACT 
Previous studies suggest that SIN stocks, the stocks issued by firms engaged in socially or morally 
objectionable operations such as alcohol, tobacco, and gambling, are neglected by the market for 
a variety of reasons. Most published finance SIN studies proceed under the premise that SIN stocks 
are riskier than non-SIN stocks; however, in these studies, the risk is not explicitly quantified. 
Using annual North American data from 1980 to 2017, we investigate the risk of a subset of SIN 
stocks and compare it to that of a matched sample of non-SIN firms with similar characteristics. 
We focus on alcohol, tobacco and gambling securities and avoid grey stocks (ambiguous sin 
classification) in both the sin and non-SIN samples. Our results show that the risk of SIN stocks 
has declined over time and depends on the SIN category. In general, alcohol stocks have less 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic volatility, and total volatility relative to their non-SIN counterparts, 
regardless of time period, while tobacco stocks have significantly reduced systematic and total risk 
but increased idiosyncratic risk over time. Moreover, the heightened risk reputation associated 
with SIN stocks can be attributed to gambling stocks, but this volatility has also decreased over 
time: The impact of being classified as a gambling firm had a significantly positive impact on risk 
from 1980-1998 but no impact from 1999-2017. Further, the role of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in mitigating the risk of SIN versus non-SIN stocks is also category sensitive. 
CSR reduces idiosyncratic volatility for alcohol firms but increases total volatility for tobacco 
firms and has no impact on the risk of gambling companies. These findings support the importance 
of measuring the changing nature of SIN stock risk by category and over time.  
 
Keywords: SIN stocks, Risk, Corporate Social Responsibility, Propensity Score Matching
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
SIN stocks refer to the equity of companies whose primary business is perceived as unethical or 
undesirable by the public. SIN companies are involved in dubious businesses that fail to meet basic 
social rules and offer products or services that can harm society. However, there is no unique 
definition of SIN activities, and studies have categorized businesses differently. In general, there 
is a consensus on the triumvirate of SIN: alcohol, tobacco, and gambling (Salaber, 2007; Hong 
and Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai, Jo, and Pan, 2012). Other studies employ broader classifications and 
may include adult entertainment (Fabozzi et al., 2008; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011), military 
(Waxler, 2004; Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017), firearms (Jo and Na, 2012), nuclear power (Guillamón-
Saorín et al., 2018), biotech (Fabozzi et al., 2008), and oil and cement (Cai et al., 2012). This thesis 
focuses on the triumvirate of SIN. 
SIN stocks have specific risk-return characteristics that make them an attractive topic for academic 
research. Most of the finance research into SIN stocks investigates their financial performance. 
Multiple studies have found that SIN stocks benefit from a sizable excess return (Fabozzi et al., 
2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011). Following these findings, 
two main explanations have been presented to justify abnormal returns for SIN stock: reputation 
risk and litigation risk. First, investors, especially institutional investors, such as pension funds and 
banks, are under social norm pressure and prefer to avoid investing in SIN companies. Also, sell-
side analysts ignore SIN firms as institutional investors are their main clients. This avoidance leads 
to limited risk sharing for holders of SIN stocks and causes these stocks to be traded at lower 
prices. Such systematic underpricing brings the vice investor a reputation risk premium (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim and Venkatachalam 2011; Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horst, 2011). 
Second, SIN stock excess return is attributed to high litigation risk associated with SIN companies’ 
services and products. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) believe that higher litigation exposure for 
SIN companies means higher idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, following Merton (1987) who believe 
that both idiosyncratic and beta matter in asset pricing, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) assert that 
SIN stocks can make excess returns. Previous studies show that SIN companies operating in 
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countries with higher litigation risk have higher risk-adjusted returns (Salaber, 2007). Following 
the findings regarding the excess return of SIN stocks as well as higher litigation exposure and 
market's widespread avoidance of SIN stocks, some papers assume that SIN stocks are riskier 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Oh et al., 2017). In fact, the 
overwhelming majority of SIN stocks studies, proceed under the premise that SIN stocks are 
riskier. Assuming SIN stocks are riskier, they examine different strategies, such as CSR, to see 
how SIN companies can mitigate their systematic, idiosyncratic, or total risk. To the best of our 
knowledge, no study focuses specifically on the quantification of risk in SIN stocks.  
We investigate the risk of SIN stocks and compare it to that of a matched non-SIN sample of 
similar firm characteristics. For this purpose, we employ annual North American data from 1980 
to 2017. We use three risk measures to compare SIN stocks with their non-SIN peers: systematic 
risk (beta), idiosyncratic risk, and total risk. Our SIN sample consists of companies involved in 
alcohol, tobacco, and gambling activities. These are traditional SIN groups that all previous 
research has classified as SIN industries. Some earlier studies select a broader range of SIN stocks 
and include military, firearms, cement, oil, and biotech stocks in their sample (Fabozzi et al., 2008; 
Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Guillamón-Saorín, et al., 2018). Firms in these non-unanimous 
SIN areas are called grey stocks. To make sure that our control sample is unequivocally non-SIN, 
we exclude these so-called grey stocks. We have 1210 firm-year observations for the SIN sample, 
consisting of 487, 108, and 615 firm-year observations for alcohol, tobacco, and gambling stocks, 
respectively. We employ three different approaches to investigate the risks of SIN stocks. First, 
we use regression analysis to investigate the relationship between our three SIN groups, 
individually and collectively, and three risk measures (beta, idiosyncratic volatility, and total 
volatility). Second, we try to find a matched sample for SIN stocks using Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) methodology and conduct a univariate test (t-test) on the difference between 
average risk measures between SIN and non-SIN. Again, matching is done for alcohol, tobacco, 
and gambling stocks separately, and for a combined SIN sample. Third, we combine PSM and 
regression analysis.  
Our results show that alcohol and tobacco stocks as well as a combined sample of all the 
triumvirate SIN stocks have less beta, idiosyncratic volatility and total volatility compared to their 
non-SIN peers over the 1980-2017 period, and these findings are robust to method. This is in sharp 
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contrast to the premise in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Cai et al. (2012), Jo and Na (2012), Oh et 
al. (2017), and Guillamón-Saorín et al. (2018).  To explore the time evolution of the risk of SIN 
stocks, we split our original sample period into two intervals, 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. The 
results show that the risk of SIN stocks has declined over time and depends on the SIN category. 
Alcohol has less systematic risk, idiosyncratic volatility, and total volatility relative to their non-
sin counterparts, regardless of time period, while tobacco stocks have reduced beta and total risk 
but increased idiosyncratic risk over time. Moreover, the impact of being classified as a gambling 
firm had a significantly positive impact on risk from 1980-1998 but no impact from 1999-2017. 
This is consistent with Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) who illustrate that the gambling industry has 
gradually become more socially acceptable since the mid-to-late 1990s due to the deregulation of 
gambling activities in an increasing number of US states. These findings support the importance 
of separately investigating each SIN category, careful SIN versus non-SIN sample selection, 
period covered, and controls. 
Prior literature has evolved under the assumption that SIN stocks are riskier than non-SIN stocks 
and considers the role of a firm’s Corporate Social responsibility (CSR) activities to reduce risk 
(Lee and Faff, 2009; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Guiral, 2012). The literature shows that CSR 
can help reduce idiosyncratic risk (Chen, Hung, and Lee, 2018), systematic risk (Monti, et al., 
2019), downside risk (Monti et al. 2019; Diemont, Moore, and Soppe, 2016), future stock price 
crash risk (Kim, Li, and Li, 2014), value at risk (Monti et al. 2019), and the cost of equity capital 
(El Ghoul et al., 2011). To test and control for the potential impact of CSR on risk, we include a 
CSR score in all our models. Using the MSCI KLD database, available between 1991 and 2013, 
we construct a firm’s CSR score as its total strengths minus total concerns in MSCI KLD’s six 
dimensions: Community, Corporate governance, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, and 
Product. We find that the role of CSR in mitigating the risk of SIN versus non-SIN stocks is 
category sensitive. CSR reduces idiosyncratic volatility for alcohol firms but increases total 
volatility for tobacco firms and has no impact on gambling stocks. This is consistent with the 
notion in prior studies that the impact of CSR on risk might vary across industries (Dowling, 2004; 
Jo and Na, 2012). 
The rest of this document proceeds as follows. Section two contains background history of SIN 
stocks, the literature review and hypothesis development. Description of the data, data sources and 
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the composition of the SIN sample are in Section three. Section four includes a brief discussion of 
propensity score matching and our methodologies. The empirical results are reported and analyzed 
in Section five with the robustness checks presented in Section six. In the last section, we conclude, 
with limitations and ideas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 SIN Companies 
SIN companies or companies that conduct business in controversial sectors have always been of 
interest to academics and practitioners. They are stereotypically considered to have greater risk, 
greater reward and to be recession proof. The definition of SIN stocks varies but in general, a firm 
may be tagged as SIN due to industry affiliation, unethical or socially irresponsible operations or 
harmful products or services. For example, Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant (2008, page 85) define SIN 
companies as “corporations which provide products or services to gratify SIN seeking behavior 
such as consumption of alcohol, adult services, gaming, tobacco, weapons, and biotech 
alterations.’’ Oh, Bae and Kim (2017, page 3) state that “sinful firms are understood as the firms 
that are stigmatized by stakeholders due to their incongruence with social norms, which could 
harm society”. Therefore, SIN companies typically are defined as the companies that fail to meet 
basic social rules and are perceived as unethical or illegitimate (Campell, 2007; Byrne, 2010; Jo. 
et al., 2016). Although there is no consensus on the definition of a SIN stock, previous research 
tends to include firms involved in tobacco, gambling and alcohol operations as unambiguous cases 
of SIN firms (Salaber, 2007; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai, Jo and Pan, 2012; Jo and Na, 2012). 
In most cultures, these three business categories compromise “SIN” stocks as they can harm public 
health, and lead to addicted behaviors (Salaber, 2007). However, there are papers that interpret a 
broader range of activities as SIN, in addition to the previously mentioned three industries, they 
include adult entertainment (Fabozzi et al., 2008; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011), military (Waxler, 
2004; Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017; Guillamón-Saorín, et al., 2017), firearms (Jo and Na, 2012), nuclear 
power (Guillamón-Saorín et al., 2017), biotech (Fabozzi et al., 2008), oil and cement (Cai et al., 2012). 
Table (2.1) exhibits the definition of SIN and the identified SIN industries in previous studies. 
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Table 2.1. Definitions of SIN companies  in previous studies 
Research Definition of SIN Industries included in the 
research 
Sample period 
Waxler (2004) ‘‘Any company that makes at least 25 % of 
its revenues from politically incorrect 
products in one of four sectors: tobacco, 
gambling, defense/weapons, and liquor’’ 
Tobacco, gambling, alcohol, 
weapons 
- 
Salaber (2007) ‘‘Returns on publicly-traded companies 
involved in producing tobacco, alcohol, and 
gaming’’ 
Alcohol, gambling, tobacco 1975–2006 
Fabozzi, Ma, and 
Oliphant (2008) 
‘any company in alcohol, gaming, tobacco, 
adult entertainment, biotech, and weapons if 
the revenue obtained from the six SIN 
product categories exceeded more than 30% 
of the company’s total revenue’’ 
Alcohol, gaming, tobacco, Adult 
entertainment, biotech, and 
weapons 
 
1970–2007 
Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) 
‘‘Publicly traded stocks in the gaming, 
tobacco, alcohol, and adult entertainment’’ 
alcohol, tobacco, gaming 1965–2006 
Kim and 
Venkatachalam 
(2011) 
“Publicly traded stocks in the gaming, 
tobacco, alcohol, and adult entertainment 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009)’’ 
Tobacco, alcohol, gaming, adult 
entertainment industry 
1988-2006 
Jo and Na (2012) “Publicly traded stocks in the gaming, 
tobacco, alcohol, and adult entertainment 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009)’’ 
Alcohol, tobacco, gambling 1991–2010 
6
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Cai, Jo, Pan (2012)  “firms in sinful industries, such as alcohol, 
tobacco, gambling, as well as those in 
industries involved with emerging 
environmental, social, or ethical issues, such 
as defense-related weapons, nuclear, oil, 
cement, and biotech 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
weapons, oil, cement, and biotech 
1995 to 2009 
Liston (2016) “The SIN portfolio is defined in a similar 
manner to Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). It 
includes only equities that are in the 
tobacco, alcohol and gaming industries” 
tobacco, alcohol, and gaming 
industries 
1988 - 2009 
Guillamón-Saorín, 
Guiral and Blanco 
(2017) 
“firms operating or being involved in 
controversial activities, such as alcohol, 
tobacco, gambling, firearms, military, and 
nuclear power” 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
firearms, military, and nuclear 
power 
2004–2008 
Blitz and Fabozzi 
(2017) 
“Four industries that are included in almost 
every study on this topic: alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, and weapons.” 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and 
weapons 
1963–2016 
7
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The definitions of SIN companies (and the corresponding SIN industries) might differ across 
various cultures (Waller, Fam, and Erdogan, 2005). Also, the companies which are taken as SIN 
companies might make a change in their products and services and therefore shift from SIN to non-
SIN companies and vice versa. This process requires that the sample of SIN companies be subject to 
reclassification across cultures and over time (Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017). In this research, we use 
SIC/NAICS codes, which automatically adjusts for the reclassification of SIN stocks over time. 
2.2 SIN companies, Performance, and associated risks 
Previous investigations into the financial performance of SIN firms conclude that vice investors 
benefit from abnormal risk-adjusted returns (Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009; Fabozzi et al., 2008; Salaber, 2007). For example, Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant 
(2008) study SIN stock performance in 21 different nations from 1970 to 2007 by forming SIN 
portfolios consisting of stocks in the alcohol, tobacco, defense, biotech, gaming, and adult services 
industries. They conclude that the SIN portfolio outperforms the market on both a raw and beta 
adjusted basis by 3% and 6%, respectively. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) use a time series 
regression to analyze SIN stock performance during the period of 1965-2006 and conclude that a 
portfolio consisting of long SIN stocks and short their comparables can make a 26 basis point 
return per month after controlling for the four-factor Carhart (1997) model. 
Reputation, litigation and information risk as well as investor sentiment are used to justify excess 
returns for SIN companies. A reputation risk premium is relevant to companies that do not conform 
to social norms and thus many investors, especially institutional investors, avoid them. Shares of 
SIN stocks are exposed to approximately 18% lower institutional ownership by institutions that 
are subjected to social norm pressure such as pension funds, universities, banks, and insurance 
companies (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Consequently, SIN stocks also have less coverage by 
sell-side analysts who generate financial reports mainly for institutional investors. This means 
limited risk sharing for those who are willing to hold SIN stocks, causing stocks to be traded at 
lower prices and to be systematically underpriced. Investors who choose to act against social norms 
and hold SIN stocks require compensation and expect to earn a reputation risk premium (Fabozzi, 
Ma, and Oliphant, 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim and Venkatachalam 2011; Derwall, 
Koedijk, and Ter Horst, 2011).  
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Excess returns for SIN stocks could also stem from the litigation risk associated with the services 
and products they offer. Due to the nature of their business, SIN companies may encounter higher 
litigation exposure and consequently costs of legal experts and punitive damage costs of lawsuits. 
Salaber (2007) utilizes the SIN stocks in 18 European countries over the period 1975-2006 to test 
whether differences in legal and cultural environments can explain the excess returns of SIN 
companies. She treats the litigation risk of the country as the determinant of SIN stock excess 
returns and assesses this risk by measures such as the number of lawyers per capita in a country, 
and litigation rate per country (number of judicial cases per inhabitants in a year). Her findings 
confirm that SIN stocks in countries with higher litigation risk have higher risk-adjusted returns 
but this excess return disappears after controlling for size and book-to-market factors. Salaber 
(2007) also mentions excise taxation as another determinant of excess returns for SIN stocks and 
shows that SIN firms operating in a country with higher excise taxation for their products have 
lower price/earnings, lower price/book ratios, depressed stock prices and thus a higher excess 
return. 
Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) investigate the role of information risk in SIN stocks as a potential 
factor to explain their excess returns. Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) posit two probable and 
contrasting behaviors by SIN companies regarding financial reporting quality. Firstly, due to the 
nature of their business, SIN companies are usually under a high degree of scrutiny, and their deep 
pockets and significant financial performance may attract potential plaintiffs (Kim, 2007). This 
heightened public awareness might motivate SIN companies to be less transparent and thus have 
lower financial reporting quality. Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) maintain that the information 
risk in the form of inferior earning quality can explain the excess return mentioned in previous 
studies. On the other hand, it is plausible that SIN firms have an incentive to demonstrate a better 
self-image to overcome investors’ social preferences and thus to prevent neglect by market 
participants (the neglect effect mentioned by Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). In this case, SIN firms 
would exhibit better earning quality in their financial statements. Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) 
show that the abnormal returns of SIN companies do not arise from this increased information risk, 
but rather these firms exhibit higher quality information than that of their control firms. They 
conclude that these companies are neglected by market participants due to the social norm stigma.  
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Investor sentiment, "a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that are not justified by 
the facts at hand" (Baker and Wurgler, 2007, page 129), is also considered a potential source of 
risk that might explain the excess returns of SIN stocks. The evidence suggests that SIN stocks 
might be affected by investor sentiment-noise trading (Liston, 2016). Previous studies show that 
SIN stocks are exposed to a lower level of analyst coverage (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), leading 
to stock undervaluation and consequently to more noise trading (Liston, 2016). Liston (2016) 
studies portfolios of triumvirate SIN stocks, and utilizes sentiments augmented asset pricing 
models (sentiments-augmented CAPM, three-factor Fama-French model (1992) and four-factor 
Carhart (1997) model) to see if both individual and institutional investor sentiment can explain 
over-performance of SIN stocks. He decomposes investor sentiment into rational and irrational 
sentiments and uses irrational sentiment as a risk factor in the models. The results suggest that 
after controlling for both individual and institutional investors sentiment, the abnormal return is 
lost (Jensen's alpha becomes insignificant). Thus, Liston (2016) suggests investor sentiment rather 
than limited risk sharing or neglect-effect as the driving factor of higher risk-adjusted return of 
SIN stocks. 
However, the existence of abnormal returns, which is hypothesized to reward the vice investors 
for the risks mentioned above, has been challenged in recent papers (Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017; Lobe 
and Walkshäusl, 2016). Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) use a global sample consisting of companies 
involved in alcohol, tobacco, gambling and weapons industries. Their result suggests that although 
SIN stocks depict a statistically significant CAPM alpha, this excess return disappears when  
controls for  size, value, momentum, as well as the profitability and investment factors introduced 
in Fama and French (2015), are included. They conclude that there is no premium specific to SIN 
stocks to compensate for reputation or litigation risks and performance of SIN stocks are 
completely in line with current asset pricing models.  
Although there are multiple studies that investigate the financial performance of SIN stocks, the 
existing literature is almost silent about quantifying risk in SIN stocks. Following the findings 
regarding the excess return of SIN stocks as well as the higher litigation exposure and market's 
widespread avoidance of SIN stocks,  all relevant papers make the assumption that SIN stocks are 
riskier (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Oh et al., 2017). Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) is one of the first studies to adopt this assumption. Using the intuition of 
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Merton (1987) that both beta and idiosyncratic risk contribute to asset pricing, Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) maintain that, since SIN companies are exposed to higher litigation risk 
associated with their products and operations, they face more risk. Also, Jo and Na (2012) state 
that risk is more of an issue for SIN firms compared to conventional firms. These arguments lead 
to our first hypothesis (H1) to test for risk in SIN stocks: 
H1: SIN stocks have higher risk than non-SIN stocks. 
The literature has evolved under the assumption that SIN stocks have higher risk. As discussed, 
the risk has not been quantified nor has it been clearly delineated. To better understand SIN stock 
risk, we separately investigate the total, idiosyncratic and systematic risks of SIN stocks.  
Idiosyncratic risk is the main category of risk attributed to the higher litigation exposure of SIN 
firms (Salaber, 2007; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Idiosyncratic risk is a measure of volatility of 
stock prices that is firm-specific, and therefore higher litigation risk in SIN stocks increases 
idiosyncratic risk. Further, idiosyncratic risk is considered the main component of total risk, such 
that Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003, p. 980) believe “idiosyncratic risk constitutes almost 85% of 
the average stock variance measure”. Thus, total risk is significantly influenced by idiosyncratic 
risk and both can be expected to be higher for SIN stocks. We formalize this in the following two 
hypotheses: 
H1a: SIN stocks have higher total risk than non-SIN stocks. 
H1b: SIN stocks have higher idiosyncratic risk than non-SIN stocks. 
The existing literature is vague about the exact nature of the relative systematic risks (beta) of SIN 
versus conventional stocks.  However, the assumption of higher risk for SIN stocks relative to non-
SIN stock (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Oh et al., 2017) is interpreted as applying 
to systematic risk as well (Jo and Na, 2012). We test this using hypothesis H1c: 
H1c: SIN stocks have higher systematic risk than non-SIN stocks. 
In contrast, some previous studies maintain that SIN stocks have a defensive nature and are 
recession proof (Fabozzi et al., 2008; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017). In 
other words, SIN stocks are less volatile than the market and have a beta value less than one.  Thus, 
we also investigate the defensive nature of SIN stocks: 
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H1d: SIN stocks have a beta less than one. 
2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility, firm risk and risk-reduction in SIN companies 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Cai et al. (2012), Jo and Na (2012), and Oh et al. (2017) assume 
that SIN stocks have more risk. Starting from this assumption, these papers attempt to investigate 
if, and how, SIN companies embrace different strategies to reduce their risk. Prior work considers 
the ability of CSR activities as a method to reduce risk (Lee and Faff, 2009; Luo and Bhattacharya, 
2009; Guiral, 2012, Chen, Hung and Lee, 2018; Monti et al., 2019). CSR acts as moral capital for 
firms and provides an insurance-like protection for firms’ shareholders against negative events 
(Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Godfrey, 2005). Engagement in CSR activities enhances stakeholders’ 
satisfaction and can lead to a better corporate reputation among stakeholders (Orlitzky, Schmidt, 
and Rynes, 2003). Further, there is a widely held view that managers use CSR to boost information 
transparency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, a higher level of transparency decreases 
the information asymmetry between firms and investors and thus reduces perceived firm risk (Cai, 
Cui, and Jo, 2016).  
Chen, Hung and Lee (2018) explore CSR and the idiosyncratic risk of listed companies in Taiwan. 
They take different market conditions into account and separate their sample periods into up-
market, down-market and correction conditions (the state between down-markets and up-markets). 
Using residuals from the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor (1992) and Carhart four-factor models 
(1997) to calculate idiosyncratic risk, they show that CSR can reduce idiosyncratic risk in all 
market states.  
Monti et al. (2019) examine the association between CSR and systematic, idiosyncratic, downside, 
and value at risk. They use a sample of firms from 52 countries for the period 2002-2015 and 
conclude that CSR reduces risk. CSR can be related to downside risk in different ways. CSR can 
be a signal that non-explicit claims (e.g. product enhancement and job security) of stakeholders 
are respected. Ignoring these stakeholder claims may lead to lawsuit related outcomes and an 
increase in company risk (McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988). Diemont, Moore, and 
Soppe (2016) also study the relationship between CSR and downside tail risk (extreme negative 
daily equity return). They use extreme value theory to calculate the value at risk at 1% as the 
measure of downside tail risk. Different aspects of CSR (community, employees, customers, 
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governance, contractors, and environment) are studied and their sample is divided into three 
regions: America, Asia, and Europe. Their findings suggest that greater CSR scores in terms of 
employee and customers rights reduce tail risks. 
In summary, these studies support CSR’s ability to protect firms from firm-specific adverse shocks 
and lower the sensitivity of firm’s cash flow in crisis or negative events (Luo and Bhattacharya, 
2006), and thus reduce systematic risk (Jo and Na, 2012; Monti et al., 2019), idiosyncratic risk 
(Godfrey, 2005; Lee and Faff, 2009; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and 
M’Zali, 2013; Chen, Hung, and Lee, 2018), and consequently total risk (Jo and Na, 2012; Bouslah 
et al., 2013; Monti et al., 2019) as well as downside risk (Diemont, Moore and Soppe, 2016; Monti 
et al., 2019).  
This literature motivates CSR as a potential risk moderator in SIN industries. Jo and Na (2012), 
for example, maintain that since risk for companies involved in SIN activities is more of an issue 
than for non-SIN companies, they are more willing and likely to engage in CSR based risk-
reduction activities. They find a negative relationship between firm total risk and CSR activities 
after controlling for several firm characteristics such as market to book ratio, firm size, debt ratio, 
R&D expenses, ROA, capital expenditure to asset ratio, operating cash flow to asset ratio and sales 
growth. Therefore, they find that SIN companies can improve their corporate image and reputation 
through CSR programs. In contrast, Guillamón-Saorín, et al. (2018) suggest that there is no risk-
reduction effect of being involved in CSR activities for SIN companies. Using 204 US companies 
in alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms, military and nuclear power over 2004 -2008, they show 
that CSR engagement does not reduce firm market risk after controlling for factors such as 
potential growth, size, financial distress, and R&D expenses. They also study the role of earning 
quality (the absolute value of discretionary accruals) in the relationship between CSR and firm 
market risk. Guillamón-Saorín et al. (2018) conclude that when firms are involved in controversial 
activities, lower quality of information can lead to higher risk and this negative effect intensifies 
as companies engage in CSR, implying the market does not trust this CSR involvement and might 
see it as a means to cover up misconduct and achieve legitimacy (Cai, Hoje, and Carrie, 2012). To 
test whether CSR can mitigate risk in each triumvirate of SIN, we put forward the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: CSR mitigates total risk in SIN stocks. 
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H2b: CSR mitigates idiosyncratic risk in SIN stocks.  
H2c: CSR mitigates systematic risk (beta) in SIN stocks
 15 
 
CHAPTER 3. DATA
Our research data is drawn from North American markets. The annual risk measures are collected 
form Beta Suites by WRDS from 1980 to 2017. The market proxy used for calculating risk 
measures is the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. The annual accounting data and firm 
characteristics come from Compustat and CRSP over the same period. Firms are required to have 
positive total assets, book and market value of equity. Following previous studies (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009), we focus on companies with a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 (common 
equities). Moreover, financial and utility companies are excluded from the sample1. 
Three risk measures are used in this research: market beta, idiosyncratic volatility, and total 
volatility. These traditional risk measures are estimated from the market model, calculated 
annually using the 60 monthly returns (5 years) preceding the last month of a given year. Equation 
(3.1) presents the market model used in Beta Suites to calculate risk measures: 
( )it t i i t t itr rf mktrf rf                       (3.1) 
Where itr is firm i’s return at time t, trf  is the one-month Treasury bill rate, and it  is an 
idiosyncratic error term of firm i at time t. tmktrf  in equation (3.1) is the excess return on the 
market (or Rm-rf) and the market return (Rm) is calculated as the value-weight return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP). The coefficient on the market variable ( i ) is the 
beta of an individual stock in the current year. Idiosyncratic risk is measured by the standard 
deviation of residuals from the market model (Ang, et al., 2006) and is presented in equation (3.2). 
( )it itIVOL Var                     (3.2) 
                                                 
1 Financial companies and utilities are represented with SIC codes 6000-6799 and 4800-4999, respectively. 
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Where itIVOL is idiosyncratic risk of firm i at time t, and it  is the error term from equation (3.1). 
Total volatility is measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous 
five years (equation 3.3): 
( )it itTVOL Var r                   (3.3) 
To fully characterize the firms in our sample, we also calculate Jensen’s alpha, the Sharpe ratio, 
and higher moments of the returns (skewness and kurtosis). Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio 
are two common risk-adjusted performance measures. We extract Jensen’s alpha from Beta Suites 
from the market model using 60 monthly returns (over five years), updated annually. i  in 
equation (3.1) presents Jensen’s alpha. Rearranging equation (3.1), we have: 
( )i it t i t t itr rf mktrf rf                 (3.4) 
 To calculate the Sharpe ratio, we obtain the excess return and stock volatility (standard deviation) 
for each stock from the market model using 60 monthly returns (over five years), updated annually. 
The Sharpe ratio for each stock is calculated as excess return from the market model divided by 
stock volatility (Sharpe, 1994), and is depicted in equation (3.5). 
it t
it
r rf
SHARPE
TVOL

                             (3.5) 
 Moreover, higher moments of returns are calculated as skewness (RET_SKEW) and kurtosis 
(RET_KURT) of monthly returns in each year, and are presented in equations (3.6) and (3.7) 
respectively2.  
3
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2 These are the formulas used by SAS software to measure sample skewness and kurtosis. 
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Where n is the number of non-missing values for stock returns, ri is the ith value of the returns, r  
is the sample average of returns, and rs is the sample standard deviation of returns (SAS 
documentation, 2010). 
3.1 SIN sample 
Our SIN sample consists of companies involved in alcohol, tobacco, and gambling activities. 
These are traditional SIN groups that all previous research has classified as SIN industries. The 
stocks with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of 2080-2085 are in the alcohol group, 
and those with SIC codes of 2100-2199 belong to the tobacco group. For gambling stocks, we 
employ the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes of 7132, 71312, 
713120, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120. We use NAICS to identify the gambling 
stocks because the SIC classification unites gambling stocks with hotel and other entertainment. 
As mentioned earlier, some previous studies contain a broader range of SIN stocks and include 
military, firearms, cement, oil, and biotech stocks in their sample (Fabozzi et al., 2008; Kim and 
Venkatachalam, 2011; Guillamón-Saorín, et al., 2018). To make sure that our control sample is 
unequivocally non-SIN, we exclude these so called grey stocks from the control group. The list of 
SIC/NAICS for different SIN categories are presented in table (3.1). Using the list of SIC/NAICS 
given above, we have 1210 firm-year observations for the SIN sample, consisting of 487 firm-year 
observations for alcohol stocks, 108 firm-year observations for tobacco stocks, and 615 firm-year 
observations for gambling securities (table 3.2). Altogether, our SIN sample comprises 9.92% of 
all SIN firms specified by the list of SIC/NAICS of SIN stocks. The rest are grey stocks. Cement 
stocks represent the majority of these grey companies at 48.22%, while oil, and military and 
firearms stocks account for 39.77% and 2.08%, respectively. 
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Table 3.1. The list of SIC/NAICS for different SIN groups 
Industries SIC NAICS 
Alcohol 2080–2085 325193, 4248, 42481, 424810, 42482, 424820, 
7224, 72241, 722410,  
Tobacco 2100–2199 424940, 453991, 11191,111910, 312, 3122, 31221, 
312210, 31222, 312221, 312229 
Gambling - 7132, 71312, 713120, 713210, 71329, 713290, 
72112, 721120 
Military 3760-3769, 3795, 3480, 3489 336992 
Firearms - 332992-332994 
Cement 2833-2836 - 
Oil 1300, 1310-1339, 1370-1382, 
1389, 2900-2912,  
2990-2999 
- 
Biotech 3240-3241 - 
 19 
 
Table 3.2 SIN stock demographics 
 # of firm years  % of firm years 
# of firms in 
each year 
(range) 
# of years 
Traditional SIN  
   
  
Alcohol 487  3.99 10-25 2-38 
Tobacco 108  0.89 4-6 2-38 
Gambling 615  5.04 5-33 1-32 
Traditional SIN Total 1,210  9.92 23-54 - 
      
Others (Grey)      
Military 254  2.08 5-10 2-38 
Firearms 0  0 0 0 
Cement 5,881  48.22 38-291 1-38 
Biotech 0  0 0 0 
Oil 4,850  39.77 94-217 1-38 
Others Total 10,985  90.08 190-393 - 
Overall 12,195   100 212-422 - 
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3.2 Variable Construction 
Table (3.3) provides a list of the variables used in this study, and the formula for calculating each 
variable if the database does not provide the variable. 
Risk Measures. The quantification of risk is central to many areas of finance. Variance is the 
primary risk measure in the literature. Markowitz (1952) portfolio selection theory uses variance 
as a measure of risk. This theory seeks to minimize the risk for a given level of expected return 
under two assumptions: the distribution of the asset's return is normal, and the utility function is 
quadratic. The variance considers the entire domain of the return and treats both movements above 
and below the mean equally. Firm total risk can be decomposed into two elements: systematic risk 
and idiosyncratic risk. Systematic risk demonstrates how changes in market returns or fundamental 
news in the market (that affect all firms in the market) can change the firm’s return. Idiosyncratic 
or firm-specific risk stems from firm-specific characteristics (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009). 
Idiosyncratic risk has been an area of focus in the literature for several reasons. Firstly, 
idiosyncratic risk reflects the main component of (total) risk. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003, p. 980) 
believe that "idiosyncratic risk constitutes almost 85% of the average stock variance measure, 
while systematic risk constitutes only 15%". Similarly, Gaspar and Massa (2006, p. 3131) report 
that “the share of idiosyncratic volatility is about 81%, while that of systematic volatility is only 
about 19%.” Secondly, several studies suggest that idiosyncratic risk can explain the cross-section 
of expected stock returns and therefore idiosyncratic risk should be priced (Merton, 1987; Malkiel 
and Xu, 2004). Therefore, idiosyncratic risk has importance in the stock market, and managers and 
investors pay particular attention to it (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009). Following the literature, we 
focus on the most widely adopted risk measures:  Total volatility, systematic risk measured by 
beta, and idiosyncratic risk (Jo and Na, 2012; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali, 2013; 
Guillamón-Saorín, et al., 2018; Monti, et al., 2019).  
Control variables. The prevalent variables used in the literature to capture differences in risk are 
firm size, firm age, debt, capital expenditure, cash and short-term investments, return on assets 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q, and the Altman Z score. Firm size, measured as the log of total assets, is one 
of the most common risk control variables. Most papers find that larger companies are less risky 
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(Jo and Na, 2012; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali, 2013; Guillamón-Saorín, et al., 2018), 
because larger firms have more opportunities to have risk-mitigation strategies. Older companies 
are expected to have less risk as they usually possess a more stable revenue stream (Nguyen and 
Nguyen, 2015; Chen, Hung, and Lee, 2018). In this study, age is calculated as the logarithm of one 
plus the number of years since the first trading date on CRSP. Leverage is also generally expected 
to increase risk. Companies with a higher debt ratio (book value of debt divided by total assets) 
are exposed to more risk because higher debt obligation increases exposure to the risk of 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs. However, some less risky companies might take advantage 
of their lower risk stats and use more debt since debt is a less costly source of financing. Therefore, 
the effect of leverage is ambiguous. Jo and Na (2012), Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali (2013), 
and Diemont, Moore, and Soppe (2016) support a positive association between leverage and risk, 
while Kim et al. (2014) show that companies with higher leverage have less risk. Jo and Na (2012) 
point out that SIN stocks with a higher level of profitability, as proxied by ROA, have less risk. Jo 
and Na (2012), and Nguyen and Nguyen (2015) believe that higher capital expenditure in 
companies, CapxR (capital expenditure divided by total assets), is associated with higher risk 
because higher capital expenditure reflects higher investments in new projects or equipment with 
uncertainty about their payoff in the future. The Altman Z score is a proxy that gauges a company’s 
likelihood of bankruptcy. Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali (2013) argue that companies with a 
higher Altman Z score (1993) are less exposed to financial distress costs and hence involve less 
risk. Tobin’s Q measures the market’s valuation of a firm relative to its assets-in-place. It takes 
into account the market’s expectation concerning the firm’s potential growth and prospects. A 
higher Tobin’s Q might show that a stock is more likely to be overvalued and thus is associated 
with higher risk. Guillamón-Saorín, et al. (2018) investigate the relationship between Tobin's Q 
and market beta and find a positive relationship between them. Finally, Jo and Na (2012) posit that 
the SIN stocks with a higher operating cash flow (cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets) experience less stock volatility. Thus, based on previous literature, we anticipate that 
Tobin’s Q and CapxR will positively affect risk, while Size, Age, ROA, CashR, and Altman Z will 
have a negative impact on risk, and the debt ratio’s impact is ambiguous. By controlling for the 
potential impact of these variables on risk, we can isolate the impact of SIN on risk.
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Table 3.3 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Beta Beta of individual stocks in current year, based on 60 monthly stock returns 
using the market model (updated annually). The market proxy is the CRSP 
value-weighted market portfolio. 
IVOL Standard deviation of residuals in the current year from the market model, 
using monthly stock returns over the previous five years. The market proxy 
is the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. 
TVOL Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous five years. 
ALPHA Jensen’s alpha based on monthly stock returns over the previous five years 
using market model. The market proxy is the CRSP value-weighted market 
portfolio. 
SHARPE Sharpe ratio calculated as excess return divided by stock volatility from the 
market model using monthly returns over the previous five years, updated 
annually. 
RET_SKEW Skewness of monthly returns in each year. 
RET_KURT Kurtosis of monthly returns in each year. 
D-alcohol (+) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the alcohol industry and 
zero otherwise. 
D-tobacco (+) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the tobacco industry and 
zero otherwise. 
D-gambling (+) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the gambling industry and 
zero otherwise. 
D_SIN (+) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the alcohol, tobacco, or 
gambling industries and zero otherwise. 
CSR Z-score (-) CSR score, by aggregating total strengths minus total concerns for each of 
the KLD’s categories (community, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, and product) converted into z-scores. 
Size (-) Firm size. The logarithm of total assets. 
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Age (-) The logarithm of one plus number of years since the first trading date on 
CRSP. 
Debt ratio (+/-) Book value of debt divided by total assets. 
CapxR (+) Capital expenditure expense divided by total assets. 
ROA (-) Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. 
CashR (-) Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. 
Tobin's Q (+) Market value of common equity plus total assets minus total value of equity 
divided by total assets. 
Altman Z (-) 3.3EBIT + sales + 1.4 retained earnings + 1.2 working capital divided by 
total assets. Altman Z-score measures the ex-ante probability of distress. 
 
 24 
 
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY
There are three different approaches used in this study to facilitate a comparison between the risk 
of SIN and conventional stocks. We utilize year fixed effect panel regressions with Newey-West 
(1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors. There are several 
advantages to panel data analysis. It allows us to get more efficient estimates that use both within 
and between (group) variations. Panel regression also captures the impact of time-invariant 
variables and controls for the variables that cannot be observed or measured (Hsiao, 2007). When 
there is autocorrelation between error terms in the regression or the variance of error terms is not 
constant, statistical inference that relies on the usual standard errors can be misleading. Although 
the estimates are still unbiased in this case, the inaccurate standard errors of the estimates make 
the t-statistics invalid (Wooldridge, 2015). Newey and West (1987) propose a heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent estimators (HAC) of the variance-covariance matrix to remedy this 
issue. To address any potential issue of autocorrelation in our models’ error terms, we employ 
Newey-West (1987) HAC standard errors with panel regression models in this research. We also 
conduct a poolability test to see if our panel data is poolable, and we employ a Hausman test to 
facilitate the choice between random and fixed effect models. 
First, we run year fixed effect regressions of market beta, total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility 
on the control variables and three dummy variables for alcohol, tobacco and gambling stocks. We 
define separate dummies for the three different SIN categories to investigate how risk is different 
across different SIN types in addition to comparing the risks of SIN and conventional stocks 
(equation 4.1). We also create a composite dummy for the 3 SIN categories combined (equation 
4.2).  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷_𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷_𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷_𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡           (4.1)  
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𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                               (4.2) 
The dependent variables, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡, are: i) beta, ii) idiosyncratic volatility, or iii) total volatility. 
𝐷_𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the alcohol industry and zero 
otherwise, 𝐷_𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the tobacco industry 
and zero otherwise, 𝐷_𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the 
gambling industry and zero otherwise, 𝐷_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑡 is dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to 
the alcohol, tobacco, or gambling industries and zero otherwise, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is firm size, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 is firm 
age, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑡 is the debt ratio, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑡 is the capital expenditure ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is return on assets, 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑡 is the cash and short-term investments ratio, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑡 is the firm’s Tobin’s Q, and 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑍𝑡 is the Altman Z score.  
Second, in a different approach, we find a matched sample for the SIN stocks using Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) methodology. Matching is done for alcohol, tobacco, and gambling stocks 
separately, and for a combined SIN sample. Similar to our previous approach, we exclude grey 
stocks from both the control and SIN groups to increase the rigor of our research. Details of the 
propensity score matching method is presented in the following section. 
4.1 Propensity Score Matching 
The propensity score, first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a), is defined as the 
probability of assigning a treatment conditional on some observed controls: Prob (Yi =1 |Xi). 
Propensity score matching balances the distribution of the controls between the treated and 
untreated subjects, meaning in the subjects with the same propensity scores, the distribution of 
controls would be the same. The propensity score is used in both randomized experiments and 
observational studies. In randomized experiments, the true propensity score is defined by the study 
design and therefore is known. However, the propensity score is not generally known in 
observational studies and is estimated by study data (Austin, 2011a). In order to determine the 
propensity score, a logit or probit model is usually used, such that the treatment status is regressed 
on a set of controls. The propensity score is the predicted probability of treatment derived from 
the fitted logit/probit regression. The propensity score matching method makes matched sets of 
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treated and control (untreated) subjects that have similar propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983a, 1985). Balancing the distribution of controls between treated and control subjects allows 
focus on the treatment and thus the comparison of outcomes between treated and control subjects 
is conducted more accurately. The treatment effect is obtained by comparing the outcomes 
between treated and untreated subjects in the matched samples. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
propose the test on the difference of the mean outcome between treated and untreated subjects in 
the matched sample to find the treatment effect.  
There are several approaches to match the subjects based on their propensity scores. First, one may 
choose to do either matching without replacements or matching with replacements. In matching 
without replacement, once an untreated subject is chosen as the pair for a treated subject, it can no 
longer be used for another treated subject. In other words, each untreated subject is going to be 
assigned to at most one treated subject. On the other hand, in matching with replacements, each 
untreated subject can be attributed to more than one treated subject (Rosenbaum, 2002; Austin, 
2011a). Another consideration in propensity score matching is the decision between greedy or 
nearest neighbor matching and optimal matching. The typical procedure in greedy matching is to 
randomly choose a treated subject and match it with the untreated subject that has the closest 
propensity score. This process continues until all treated subjects are assigned to an untreated 
subject. In case of multiple untreated subjects with the same propensity score for a treated subject, 
one of them is randomly chosen. Alternatively, the optimal matching method tries to find the 
untreated subjects, such that the total difference of propensity scores between matched pairs is 
minimized (Rosenbaum, 2002; Austin, 2011a). There is another method which is utilized widely 
in this area, called nearest neighbor matching within a specified caliper distance (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985). This method puts a restriction on the nearest neighbor method, such that only 
untreated observations within a certain distance, as measured by difference in propensity scores 
relative to the treated subjects, are employed. This threshold distance is called caliper. Similar to 
the nearest neighbor method, the untreated subject with the closest propensity score to the treated 
one is selected from the set. If there are no subjects in the set to be matched with a treated subject, 
the treated subject is removed from the sample (Austin, 2011a). 
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Theoretically, the propensity score matching method can be depicted as follows: Let X denote a 
vector of control variables, Y denotes the outcome variable, and Z denotes the treatment (Z=1 
treated, Z=0 not treated). The propensity score e(X) is defined as: 
( ) ( 1| )e X x pr Z X x                                   (4.3) 
Each subject in the sample can take one of two potential outcomes: either the outcome under 
treatment (1)iY or the outcome without treatment (0) :iY  
(0) 0
( )
(1) 1
i i
i i i
i i
Y if Z
Y Y Z
Y if Z

  

                              (4.4) 
And finally, the average treatment effect (ATE) is calculated as the mean of the outcomes under 
treatment minus the outcomes without treatment: 
[ (1) (0)]ATE E Y Y                                         (4.5) 
In this study, the propensity scores are estimated for SIN and non-SIN stocks using a logistic 
regression of one of the SIN dummy variables on size, age, and the debt ratio. Specifically, we 
first run the following logit models to obtain the propensity scores: 
𝐷_𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                         (4.6) 
𝐷_𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                       (4.7) 
𝐷_𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                   (4.8) 
𝐷_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                  (4.9) 
𝐷_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                        (4.10) 
Using equations (4.6) to (4.10), we measure propensity scores for alcohol, tobacco, and gambling 
stocks separately, as well as for a combined SIN and a non-SIN category (control group). We do 
propensity score matching employing the greedy method without replacement and with caliper 
0.2. We use this caliper following Austin (2011b), who finds that the optimal caliper width for 
estimating the differences in means is 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity 
score. Moreover, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) show that the logit of propensity scores are more 
likely to be normally distributed, and hence it is better to match on the logit of propensity scores 
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as opposed to merely propensity scores. Following their findings, we match the observations based 
on the logit of propensity scores extracted from the above models. We also match pairs of stocks 
in the same year to control for the time factor. 
We do t-tests on the three control variables before and after matching to ensure the proper isolation 
of the impact of treatment. Next, we conduct univariate tests (t-tests) on the mean risk differences 
of SIN versus the non-SIN matched sample for each grouping (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and a 
combined sample). In the robustness section, we repeat this investigation starting with PSM using 
all eight control variables. 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table (5.1) provides a statistical summary of the firm characteristics (control variables) for various 
SIN and non-SIN groupings from 1980 to 2017. The mean size for alcohol (6.26), tobacco (8.25), 
and gambling stocks (5.94) show that SIN stocks, on average, are larger than non-SINs (5.20) at a 
1% level of significance using the difference in means test. Among the SIN groups, tobacco 
companies are oldest (3.8) and gambling firms are youngest (2.4), on average. We also find that 
the debt ratio is significantly higher at 1%, on average, for SIN stocks (0.23 for alcohol, 0.29 for 
tobacco, and 0.40 for gambling) relative to non-SIN firms (0.21). This is consistent with the Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009) conclusion that SIN companies raise their capital with more debt than non-
SIN firms. Moreover, SIN stocks are more profitable relative to their total assets (ROA) (0.12 for 
alcohol, 0.28 for tobacco, and 0.12 for gambling), on average, than non-SINs (0.09). Both tobacco 
(5.69) and gambling (6.55) stocks have, on average, a lower probability of exposure to financial 
distress relative to the non-SIN group (4.82). All these differences are significant at 1%.
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Table 5.1 Statistical summary 
Table 5.1 presents the statistical summary of the firm characteristics (control variables) across alcohol, tobacco, gambling, all SINs 
combined, and non-SIN groups over 1980-2017. We define Size as logarithm of total assets, Age as the logarithm of one plus number 
of years since the first trading date on CRSP, Debt ratio as the Book value of debt divided by total assets, CapxR as the capital 
expenditure expenses divided by total assets, ROA as the Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, CashR as the 
cash and short-term investments divided by total assets, Tobin's Q as the market value of common equity plus total asset minus total 
value of equity divided by total assets, and Altman Z as Altman Z score (1993) measured as 3.3EBIT + sales + 1.4 retained earnings + 
1.2 working capital divided by total assets. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Industry Variable N Mean Median S.D 25th  75th  Max Min 
Alcohol 
Size 487 6.2567*** 5.8847 2.4012 4.2845 8.4421 11.6301 2.0066 
Age 487 2.8995*** 2.8904 0.8825 2.1972 3.5553 4.5433 1.3863 
Debt ratio 486 0.2292*** 0.2187 0.1612 0.1053 0.3573 0.6625 0 
CapxR 482 0.0558*** 0.0426 0.0477 0.0203 0.0767 0.2717 0 
ROA 487 0.1175*** 0.1274 0.1153 0.0703 0.1922 0.3821 -0.5441 
CashR 487 0.1064*** 0.0444 0.1807 0.0109 0.1082 0.9945 0 
Tobin's Q 487 1.766*** 1.3436 1.1398 1.0610 2.1145 7.2602 0.4054 
Altman Z 476 3.8661*** 3.2558 5.6743 2.1952 4.4253 82.3775 -13.2281 
Tobacco 
Size 108 8.2522*** 9.1369 2.3053 6.0065 10.4934 11.5894 3.7940 
Age 108 3.8315*** 4.1744 0.8857 4.0604 4.3108 4.5433 1.3863 
Debt ratio 108 0.2850*** 0.2775 0.1467 0.1849 0.3923 0.6870 0 
CapxR 108 0.0346*** 0.0288 0.0285 0.0126 0.0458 0.1592 0.0014 
3
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ROA 108 0.2767*** 0.2082 0.2193 0.1283 0.3322 0.9651 0.0586 
CashR 108 0.078*** 0.0527 0.0936 0.0119 0.1122 0.6882 0.0027 
Tobin's Q 108 2.6819*** 1.9680 2.1693 1.3881 2.9642 10.7892 0.6557 
Altman Z 96 5.6889*** 3.6136 5.3377 2.7401 7.0444 30.3701 0.8728 
Gambling 
Size 615 5.9434*** 5.8629 1.9521 4.7228 7.2327 10.2805 0.0354 
Age 615 2.4077*** 2.4849 0.5947 1.9459 2.8904 3.6889 1.3863 
Debt ratio 615 0.4041*** 0.4372 0.2343 0.2126 0.5847 0.8929 0 
CapxR 594 0.0927*** 0.0636 0.0947 0.0304 0.1161 0.5931 0 
ROA 613 0.1179*** 0.1239 0.1049 0.0783 0.1739 0.4850 -0.6837 
CashR 615 0.1259*** 0.0872 0.1152 0.0495 0.1682 0.9714 0.0041 
Tobin's Q 615 1.603*** 1.3171 1.1819 1.0524 1.7290 15.5136 0.3993 
Altman Z 612 6.5545** 2.0296 66.2290 1.2625 3.2255 34.5236 -8.1603 
All SINs 
Size 1,210 6.2756*** 6.0461 2.2647 4.6632 7.9639 11.6301 0.0354 
Age 1,210 2.7327*** 2.7081 0.8573 2.0794 3.2189 4.5433 1.3863 
Debt ratio 1,209 0.3232*** 0.3088 0.2174 0.1495 0.4790 0.8929 0 
CapxR 1,184 0.0724*** 0.0489 0.0771 0.0241 0.0924 0.5931 0 
ROA 1,208 0.1319*** 0.1285 0.1314 0.0792 0.1894 0.9651 -0.6837 
CashR 1,210 0.1137*** 0.0687 0.1444 0.0312 0.1429 0.9945 0.0000 
Tobin's Q 1,210 1.7649*** 1.3499 1.3178 1.0656 1.9848 15.5136 0.3993 
Altman Z 1,184 5.4035*** 2.6406 47.7734 1.5675 4.0052 34.5236 -13.2281 
Non-SIN 
Size 83,552 5.2041*** 5.1002 2.0759 3.6903 6.6161 13.5896 0.0010 
Age 83,552 2.7170*** 2.7081 0.6846 2.1972 3.1781 4.5433 1.3863 
Debt ratio 83,251 0.2083*** 0.1854 0.1812 0.0385 0.3276 0.9646 0 
3
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CapxR 82,659 0.0560*** 0.0392 0.0591 0.0199 0.0716 1.5113 -0.1518 
ROA 83,324 0.0935*** 0.1173 0.1762 0.0561 0.1728 1.9266 -4.7430 
CashR 83,536 0.1542*** 0.0837 0.1781 0.0251 0.2216 0.9992 -0.0102 
Tobin's Q 83,552 1.7710*** 1.3396 1.5788 1.0275 1.9442 68.7362 0.1153 
Altman Z 80,850 4.8194*** 3.5405 12.7757 2.3039 5.3728 79.2314 -18.6549 
3
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Table (5.2) exhibits the descriptive statistics for risk and performance measures across the 
triumvirate of SIN, all three SIN classes combined, and the non-SIN group. Gambling stocks have 
the highest market beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk across all groupings. The average market 
beta for gambling stocks is 1.18, while this figure for alcohol, tobacco, and conventional stocks is 
0.8, 0.67, and 1.17, respectively. Gambling stocks have the highest market risk among SIN stocks, 
and have similar market risk relative to conventional stocks using the difference in means test3 and 
a significance level of 1%. The idiosyncratic and total risks for gambling and non-SIN stocks are 
also similar using the difference in means test. We test SIN stock betas against one to investigate 
the hypothesized defensive nature of SIN stocks. The mean betas for alcohol and tobacco stocks 
are significantly less than one (at 1%) and support the statement that SIN stocks are recession proof 
(Fabozzi et al., 2008; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Blitz and Fabozzi, 2017). However, the 
mean beta for gambling stocks and for the sample of all SIN stocks suggest that SIN stocks are not 
recession proof (insignificant). Therefore, the results support hypothesis H1d for alcohol and 
tobacco stocks, but not for gambling and the all SIN sample. The idiosyncratic and total volatility 
averages for alcohol and tobacco are less than for conventional stocks, using a difference in means 
test and a 1% level of significance. For example, the mean idiosyncratic risk for alcohol and 
tobacco is 0.099 and 0.0715, respectively, versus 0.138 for conventional stocks. In addition, the 
average total risk for alcohol and tobacco is 0.1076 and 0.0794, respectively, while it is 0.1509 for 
conventional stocks. Furthermore, if we compare the all SIN sample with the conventional stock 
sample, higher average risk measures are observed for conventional stocks at 1%. These results 
are not consistent with the premise in the existing literature that SIN stocks are risker than non-
SIN stocks and thus do not support hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c.  
The existing literature tests and finds higher risk-adjusted performance measures for SIN stocks 
(Salaber, 2007; Fabozzi et al., 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011). 
For our sample and the period 1980 to 2017, the mean ALPHA for each SIN category is statistically 
significant at 1%, except for alcohol, which is significant at 5%, indicating SIN outperforms the 
market, especially for tobacco. Among the triumvirate of SIN, only the tobacco group has a 
                                                 
3 This test assumes the observations are independent. As a robustness check, we regressed each risk measure on a 
constant with Newey-West (1987) HAC standard errors for each SIN and non-SIN group and used the estimated 
constant as the estimated mean. We conducted t-test on the difference of these estimated means between the SIN 
categories versus the non-SIN samples. The results are like the ones based on the descriptive statistics measures in 
table (5.2) and the differences are significant at 1%. 
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significant mean Sharpe ratio (0.3034). The non-SIN sample has a mean Sharpe ratio of -0.0137, 
which is significant at 1%, but the sample of all SIN stocks has an insignificant mean Sharpe ratio 
(0.0021). Altogether, the tobacco group has the highest mean ALPHA and SHARPE measures 
across all categories, suggesting tobacco stocks can make significantly higher risk-adjusted 
returns. This is consistent with Hong and Kacperczyck (2009), who argue that tobacco stocks are 
exposed to more litigation risk compared to other SIN groups and that higher litigation risk might 
drive some of its higher excess return.  
Asset returns distributions are asymmetric and leptokurtic (Longin, 1996; Peiro, 1999). Except for 
tobacco, the distributions for SIN stocks are significantly positively skewed at 1% between 1980 
and 2017. Among SIN groups, gambling has the highest mean return skewness (0.4273) followed 
by alcohol (0.2949). Positive skewness reflects a small chance of large gains and it is similar for 
the SIN and non-SIN samples (0.3425, 0.3410 respectively). The mean RET_KURT is positive 
and significant at 1% for all groups, indicating fat tails (higher frequencies of outcomes) at the 
extreme negative and positive ends of the distribution. Among the SIN categories, alcohol has the 
highest mean return kurtosis (0.7979), then gambling (0.7558) and tobacco (0.4639). However, 
SIN stocks generally have a significantly (at 1%) lower mean return kurtosis (0.7466 versus 
0.7638) than non-SIN stocks, suggesting a lower chance of extreme negative and positive events 
for SIN stocks relative to non-SIN stocks. 
Thus, alcohol and tobacco stocks have less market, idiosyncratic, and total risk than conventional 
stocks, while gambling stocks have higher market risk and similar idiosyncratic and total risk 
compared to non-SIN stocks. The risk-adjusted return is significant and positive for tobacco, but 
not for other SIN groups. Further, SIN stocks have thinner tails than non-SIN stocks in their return 
distributions, indicating a lower chance of extreme negative and positive events compared to non-
SIN stocks.
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Table 5.2 Statistical summary for risk measures across different SIN classes  
Table 5.2 represents the summary statistics of risk measures between 1980 and 2017 across four different groups: alcohol stocks, tobacco 
stocks, gambling stocks, the aggregated sample of the three SIN stocks, and non-SIN stocks. We define Beta as the beta of individual 
stocks in the current year, based on monthly stock returns over the previous five years using the market model, IVOL is standard 
deviation of residuals in the current year from the market model, using monthly stock returns over the previous five years, TVOL is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous five years, ALPHA is Jensen’s alpha based on monthly stock returns over 
five years using the market model, Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio calculated as excess return divided by stock volatility from market model 
using monthly returns over five years, updated annually, and RET_SKEW and RET_KURT are the skewness and kurtosis of monthly 
returns in each year, respectively. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Industry Variable N Mean Median S.E 25th  75th  Max Min 
Alcohol 
Beta 487 0.7981*** 0.7386 0.5665 0.4207 1.0920 3.2984 -0.7624 
IVOL 487 0.0990*** 0.0865 0.0512 0.0636 0.1152 0.4240 0.0283 
TVOL 487 0.1076*** 0.0949 0.0528 0.0732 0.1239 0.4357 0.0323 
ALPHA 487 0.0018** 0.0043 0.0178 -0.0045 0.0114 0.0508 -0.0882 
SHARPE 485 -0.0043 -0.0215 0.8870 -0.5348 0.5240 2.8571 -3.3919 
RET_SKEW 487 0.2949*** 0.2112 0.8882 -0.3292 0.8538 3.3391 -2.1137 
RET_KURT 486 0.7979*** 0.1783 1.9879 -0.5232 1.5209 11.3686 -1.8763 
Tobacco 
Beta 108 0.6717*** 0.6525 0.3341 0.4553 0.9128 1.7134 -0.3239 
IVOL 108 0.0715*** 0.0640 0.0255 0.0509 0.0917 0.1508 0.0397 
TVOL 108 0.0794*** 0.0742 0.0240 0.0625 0.0956 0.1728 0.0434 
ALPHA 108 0.0093*** 0.0103 0.0119 0.0052 0.0155 0.0369 -0.0475 
SHARPE 107 0.3034*** 0.2689 0.8656 -0.2598 0.9008 3.0467 -1.7330 
3
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RET_SKEW 108 0.0764 0.0507 0.7650 -0.4463 0.5278 2.2294 -1.5589 
RET_KURT 108 0.4637*** 0.1451 1.4960 -0.6567 1.1251 6.0538 -1.7822 
Gambling 
Beta 615 1.1842*** 1.1130 0.8361 0.6613 1.6362 5.4717 -1.9497 
IVOL 615 0.1462*** 0.1343 0.0582 0.1019 0.1764 0.3875 0.0480 
TVOL 615 0.1578*** 0.1442 0.0596 0.1147 0.1885 0.3921 0.0509 
ALPHA 615 0.0043*** 0.0034 0.0225 -0.0093 0.0167 0.1015 -0.0914 
SHARPE 606 -0.0459 -0.0915 0.8785 -0.5258 0.3829 4.8079 -2.7468 
RET_SKEW 612 0.4273*** 0.3809 0.8405 -0.1691 0.9343 3.0079 -1.8527 
RET_KURT 612 0.7558*** 0.1928 1.9731 -0.5912 1.4875 9.7350 -1.9527 
All SIN 
Beta 1,210 0.9830*** 0.8889 0.7328 0.5250 1.3420 5.4717 -1.9497 
IVOL 1,210 0.1205*** 0.1076 0.0597 0.0783 0.1549 0.4240 0.0283 
TVOL 1,210 0.1306*** 0.1176 0.0616 0.0866 0.1635 0.4357 0.0323 
ALPHA 1,210 0.0037*** 0.0047 0.0201 -0.0059 0.0141 0.1015 -0.0914 
SHARPE 1,198 0.0021 -0.0447 0.8853 -0.5103 0.4719 4.8079 -3.3919 
RET_SKEW 1,207 0.3425*** 0.2852 0.8594 -0.2386 0.8654 3.3391 -2.1137 
RET_KURT 1,206 0.7466*** 0.1870 1.9421 -0.5853 1.4755 11.3686 -1.9527 
Non_SIN 
Beta 83,508 1.1658*** 1.0936 0.7585 0.6993 1.5311 5.5837 -3.1270 
IVOL 83,508 0.1383*** 0.1199 0.0793 0.0863 0.1688 0.9366 0.0165 
TVOL 83,508 0.1509*** 0.1324 0.0811 0.0978 0.1815 0.9541 0.0175 
ALPHA 83,508 0.0042*** 0.0036 0.0202 -0.0068 0.0144 0.3818 -0.1715 
SHARPE 83,019 -0.0137*** -0.0712 0.9505 -0.5507 0.4578 3.4849 -3.8698 
RET_SKEW 83,105 0.3410*** 0.2979 0.8752 -0.2233 0.8650 3.4641 -2.4455 
RET_KURT 83,026 0.7638*** 0.2002 2.0152 -0.6042 1.4959 12.0000 -2.9843 
3
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To examine the collinearity properties of the variables in preparation for regression analysis, we 
calculate Pearson correlations. The Pearson correlation matrix for the risk measures and the control 
variables is presented in table (5.3). Unless otherwise noted, all correlations are significant at 1%. 
Size, age, and the debt ratio are significantly negatively associated with most of the risk measures, 
with an exception for the significantly positive relationship between size and Beta (+0.076). The 
negative correlations of size and age with the risk measures range from -0.469 (size and IVOL) to 
-0.125 (age and beta) and are all larger than the correlations between the risk measures and the 
debt ratio (range from -0.076 to -0.026). This is consistent with the Nguyen and Nguyen (2015) 
result that bigger or older companies usually have less idiosyncratic and total volatility. Tobin’s Q 
and the cash and short-term investments ratio (CashR) are also significant and positively related 
to all risk measures with magnitudes of approximately 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. On the other hand, 
an increase in capital expenditure and ROA contributes to less risk, regardless of risk measure. 
The correlations between CapxR and the three risk measures are small, ranging from -0.018 (Beta) 
to -0.068 (IVOL and TVOL) and the correlation of ROA with Beta is small (-0.11) but stronger 
than with TVOL (-0.358) and IVOL (-0.364). Most of the correlations between control variables 
are statistically significant, except for relationships with the Altman Z score. However, none of 
the control variables have particularly strong correlations with each other. The largest correlation 
is between the debt ratio and CashR (-0.456) followed by the correlation between Age and Size 
(0.41), while the majority of the correlations (22/28) are below 0.2. This mitigates multi-
collinearity concerns for regression analysis.  
We continue our investigation into risk and SIN versus non-SIN categories by doing multivariate 
regressions, which allows us to control for firm features that might also impact risk.
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Table 5.3 The Pearson Correlation Coefficients matrix 
Table 5.3 presents the correlations for risk measures and control variables for the entire sample from 1980 to 2017. ***, **, and * stand 
for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
(1) Beta 1           
(2) IVOL 0.307*** 1          
(3) TVOL 0.417*** 0.989*** 1         
(4) Size 0.076*** -0.469*** -0.426*** 1        
(5) Age -0.125*** -0.364*** -0.358*** 0.410*** 1       
(6) Debt ratio -0.076*** -0.026*** -0.033*** 0.132*** 0.005 1      
(7) CapxR -0.018*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 0.010*** -0.074*** 0.090*** 1     
(8) ROA -0.114*** -0.370*** -0.363*** 0.300*** 0.160*** 0.017*** 0.149*** 1    
(9) CashR 0.207*** 0.200*** 0.216*** -0.149** -0.158*** -0.456*** -0.159*** -0.212*** 1   
(10) Tobin's Q 0.100*** 0.125*** 0.127*** -0.028*** -0.099*** -0.198*** 0.046*** -0.094*** 0.302*** 1  
(11) Altman Z 0.009** -0.002 -0.003 -0.040*** -0.031*** -0.177*** -0.004 0.090*** 0.175*** 0.360*** 1 
3
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5.2 Regression Analysis  
To proceed, we separately regress each risk measure on the dummies for alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling stocks, controlling for size, age, debt, Tobin’s Q, cash and short-term investments, 
capital expenditure, ROA, and Altman Z score (see equation 4.1). We also create a composite 
dummy for the three SIN categories combined (equation 4.2). To begin, we explore the hypothesis 
that SIN stocks have different risks than non-SIN stocks by separately estimating equation (4.1) 
for each of beta, idiosyncratic volatility, and total volatility.  
To determine an appropriate estimation method for our panel data, we conduct the poolability test. 
The poolability test examines if the slopes are the same across groups or over time (Baltagi, 2001). 
The null hypothesis states that the sensitivity of the dependent variable to an explanatory variable 
is the same for all cross section units and that this is true for each regressor. We reject the null 
hypothesis of poolability and conclude that each firm has its own slope for each regressor and 
therefore, it is better to use a fixed or random effects model. The Hausman test is used to choose 
the correct specification. The results, table (5.4), show that the null hypothesis of random effects 
is rejected at all levels. Thus, we include year fixed effects in the regression and re-run the model. 
The results of “F-test for no fixed effects” (reported in table 5.5) confirms the presence of fixed 
effects in the model. The fixed effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between 
the individuals. Thus, the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects models cannot be biased 
because of omitted time-invariant characteristics and we can control for any potential correlation 
in unobserved variables across time (Wooldridge, 2015).
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Table 5.4 Hausman Test for the investigation of random vs fixed effect specification 
Variables (1) Beta (2) IVOL (3) TVOL 
D-alcohol 
-0.33396***  
(0.089) 
-0.0276*** 
 (0.00839) 
-0.03085***  
(0.00872) 
D-tobacco 
-0.50337**  
(0.2025) 
-0.03513* 
 (0.0191) 
-0.03809* 
 (0.0198) 
D-gambling 
-0.07333 
 (0.0751) 
0.015558**  
(0.00707) 
0.011719 
 (0.00735) 
Size 
0.070692*** 
 (0.0026) 
-0.01266**  
(0.000232) 
-0.01115*** 
 (0.000242) 
Age 
-0.18203***  
(0.00584) 
-0.00809** 
 (0.000508) 
-0.0114*** 
 (0.000531) 
Debt ratio 
-0.07739*** 
 (0.0181) 
0.023333** 
 (0.00155) 
0.021459*** 
 (0.00162) 
CapxR 
0.152364*** 
 (0.0477) 
-0.06368*** 
 (0.00405) 
-0.06212*** 
 (0.00423) 
ROA 
-0.25628*** 
 (0.0169) 
-0.03758*** 
 (0.00144) 
-0.04083*** 
 (0.00151) 
CashR 
0.458809***  
(0.0191) 
0.021103*** 
 (0.00163) 
0.028708***  
(0.00171) 
Tobin's Q 
0.010818*** 
 (0.00177) 
0.003592*** 
 (0.00015) 
0.003284***  
(0.000157) 
Altman z 
0.000454**  
(0.000184) 
-0.00003* 
 (0.000016) 
-0.00003 
 (0.000016) 
_Cons 
1.244629***  
(0.0168) 
0.225248***  
(0.00145) 
0.238414*** 
 (0.00152) 
Random effects included Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman Test P-value for 
random effects 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Observations 87437 87437 87437 
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Table 5.5 Regression Analysis for different SIN groups 
Variables (1) Beta  (2) IVOL  (3) TVOL 
D-alcohol -0.35528*** 
(0.0408)  
-0.01907*** 
(0.00352)  
-0.02396*** 
(0.00364) 
D-tobacco -0.45046*** 
(0.0899)  
0.013227*** 
(0.00421)  
0.004689 
(0.00441) 
D-gambling -0.03053 
(0.0499)  
0.003367 
(0.00331)  
0.002328 
(0.00363) 
Size 0.073835*** 
(0.00241)  
-0.01611*** 
(0.000231)  
-0.01404*** 
(0.000241) 
Age -0.19185*** 
(0.00625)  
-0.01799*** 
(0.000518)  
-0.02004*** 
(0.00055) 
Debt ratio -0.03901 
(0.0254)  
0.046506*** 
(0.00221)  
0.044287*** 
(0.00232) 
CapxR 0.17293*** 
(0.0636)  
-0.00124 
(0.00567)  
0.001007 
(0.00586) 
ROA -0.47991*** 
(0.0337)  
-0.0786*** 
(0.00378)  
-0.08398*** 
(0.00395) 
CashR 0.706642*** 
(0.03)  
0.026636*** 
(0.0025)  
0.036197*** 
(0.00267) 
Tobin's Q 0.024328*** 
(0.00391)  
0.003407*** 
(0.00039)  
0.003613*** 
(0.000413) 
Altman z -0.00127* 
(0.000753)  
-0.00014* 
(0.000075)  
-0.00016* 
(0.000084) 
_Cons 1.101888*** 
(0.0306)  
0.252826*** 
(0.00251)  
0.251055*** 
(0.0026) 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value for fixed 
effect F-test 
<.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
R-Squared 0.1195***  0.4117***  0.3776*** 
Observations 87400  87400  87400 
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Table (5.5) presents the estimates from the year4 fixed effects estimation of equation (4.1). The 
fixed effects regression results for market beta confirm that the average beta for alcohol and 
tobacco stocks are statistically significantly lower (-.3553 and -.4505, respectively) while the beta 
for gambling stocks is statistically indistinguishable compared to the beta of non-SIN firms. These 
amounts are statistically (at 1%) as well as economically significant. Thus, contrary to H1c, we do 
not find a stronger systematic risk for SIN stocks relative to non-SIN stocks.  
Alcohol stocks have on average 0.01907 and 0.02396 significantly less idiosyncratic risk and total 
risk compared to non-SIN stocks (at 1%), yet for gambling stocks, both measures are statistically 
insignificant, suggesting gambling and non-SIN stocks possess, on average, the same level of 
idiosyncratic and total risk. Tobacco stocks, on the other hand, have statistically significantly (at 
1%) more idiosyncratic risk (0.0132) which supports H1b, but show no difference in total risk 
compared to non-SIN stocks. The control variables generally have the expected signs. An increase 
in cash ratio and Tobin’s Q leads to a significant increase in all risk measures, which is consistent 
with Guillamón-Saorín et al. (2018), while return on assets and age are significantly negatively 
associated with risk (at 1%). Size is negatively related to beta, but positively related to 
idiosyncratic and total risk, all significant at 1%. In addition, the debt ratio does not significantly 
impact beta, but it has significantly positive association (at 1%) with idiosyncratic and total risk.  
Thus, we have only one instance, tobacco and idiosyncratic risk, where our data supports any of 
hypotheses H1a-H1c and the generally cited statement in the existing literature that SIN stocks are 
riskier than non-SIN stocks (Hong and Kacperczyck 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Oh 
et al., 2017). Our sharply contrasting findings may reflect the explicit quantification of risk, 
importance of period coverage, controls, separate investigation of each SIN category, careful SIN 
versus non-SIN sample selection or a combination of these factors. 
                                                 
4 We assume that heterogeneity across units is not an issue as we control for SIN versus non-SIN using industry 
dummies and a broad set of controls. 
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Table 5.6 Regression Analysis results for the sample of all SIN stocks 
Variables (1) Beta  (2) IVOL  (3) TVOL 
D-SIN -0.19799*** 
(0.0324) 
 -0.00501** 
(0.00233) 
 -0.00824*** 
(0.0025) 
Size 0.073644*** 
(0.00241) 
 -0.01611*** 
(0.000231) 
 -0.01404*** 
(0.000241) 
Age -0.19349*** 
(0.00624) 
 -0.018*** 
(0.000516) 
 -0.02008*** 
(0.000549) 
Debt ratio -0.03062 
(0.0254) 
 0.047021*** 
(0.0022) 
 0.044906*** 
(0.00232) 
CapxR 0.191976*** 
(0.0635) 
 -0.0007 
(0.00566) 
 0.00183 
(0.00585) 
ROA -0.48041*** 
(0.0336) 
 -0.07844*** 
(0.00377) 
 -0.08384*** 
(0.00395) 
CashR 0.710837*** 
(0.0299) 
 0.026904*** 
(0.00249) 
 0.036517*** 
(0.00267) 
Tobin's Q 0.023821*** 
(0.00391) 
 0.003407*** 
(0.00039) 
 0.003605*** 
(0.000413) 
Altman z -0.00122 
(0.000756) 
 -0.00014* 
(0.000075) 
 -0.00016* 
(0.000084) 
_Cons 1.106459*** 
(0.0306) 
 0.252688*** 
(0.0025) 
 0.251001*** 
(0.0026) 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value for fixed 
effect F-test 
<.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
R-Squared 0.1188***  0.4114***  0.3772*** 
Observations 87400  87400  87400 
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We also run the model for all three SIN stocks combined (alcohol, tobacco, gambling) by defining 
𝐷_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑡 as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the alcohol, tobacco, or gambling 
industries and zero otherwise. We test the model specification using the Hausman test and find the 
presence of fixed effects. Consequently, we conduct year fixed effects panel regression analysis 
and exhibit the results in table (5.6). The control variables are mostly significant at 1% and have 
the anticipated signs. The coefficient for the SIN dummy is negative and significant for all three 
risk measures with estimates of -.198, -0.005, and -0.008 for beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk 
respectively. Thus, these results are contrary to the premise in Hong and Kacperczyck (2009), Cai 
et al. (2012), Jo and Na (2012), and Oh et al. (2017), and show that risk of SIN stocks is not greater 
than that of non-SIN stocks and actually less, regardless of risk measures. The results for our 
aggregated SIN group also do not support hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c.  
5.3 Propensity Score Matching  
We have compared SIN to non-SIN stocks using conventional approaches but in order to isolate 
the treatment effect more carefully and thoroughly we will also use propensity score matching 
(PSM). Propensity score matching eliminates the “curse of dimensionality” when one wishes to 
match on several characteristics and increases the measurement accuracy of the treatment effect 
(Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011). This method ensures that the two groups of subjects are 
matched equally on all factors (except for treatment), and thus the comparison between two groups 
is done more carefully and reliably.  
We first match each SIN stock with a similar non-SIN stock based on three characteristics or 
control variables and do a t-test on the mean difference of each risk measure between SIN and its 
matched non-SIN. In addition, we estimate equation (4.1) on the matched sample employing 
dummies for different SIN types and all the control variables. We choose size, age, and the debt 
ratio to match the stocks, as these are the variables that show the highest level of overlap between 
our treated and untreated samples. By doing that, we aim to get better matching quality, as 
matching on only three variables can be done more tightly than on all eight control variables with 
different levels of overlap. 
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Table 5.7 The Propensity Score Matching on Size, Age, and the Debt ratio, t-test on the difference 
of the control variables 
Alcohol Sample Treated Control Difference S.E P-value 
Size Unmatched 6.2567 5.2041 1.0526*** 2.0779 <.0001 
 Matched 6.2566 6.2435 0.013 2.4373 0.9336 
Age Unmatched 2.8995 2.717 0.1826*** 0.6859 <.0001 
 Matched 2.899 2.9661 -0.0671 0.8234 0.204 
Debt ratio Unmatched 0.2292 0.2083 0.0209*** 0.181 0.0046 
  Matched 0.2292 0.2214 -0.00778 0.1679 0.4704 
Tobacco Sample Treated Control Difference S.E P-value 
Size Unmatched 8.2522 5.2041 3.048*** 2.0762 <.0001 
 Matched 8.2961 8.3759 -0.0799 2.3111 0.8034 
Age Unmatched 3.8315 2.717 1.1146*** 0.6849 <.0001 
 Matched 3.9256 3.9232 0.00235 0.6561 0.9794 
Debt ratio Unmatched 0.285 0.2083 0.0767*** 0.1811 <.0001 
  Matched 0.287 0.2658 0.0212 0.1566 0.3307 
Gambling Sample Treated Control Difference S.E P-value 
Size Unmatched 5.9434 5.2041 0.7393*** 2.075 <.0001 
 Matched 5.933 6.0521 -0.119 1.9898 0.2955 
Age Unmatched 2.4077 2.717 -0.3093*** 0.684 <.0001 
 Matched 2.4123 2.3825 0.0298 0.6241 0.404 
Debt ratio Unmatched 0.4041 0.2083 0.1958*** 0.1816 <.0001 
  Matched 0.4025 0.3893 0.0132 0.2366 0.3284 
All SINs Sample Treated Control Difference S.E P-value 
Size Unmatched 6.2756 5.2041 1.0715*** 2.0787 <.0001 
 Matched 6.2744 6.1404 0.134 2.2403 0.1417 
Age Unmatched 2.7327 2.717 0.0158 0.6874 0.5246 
 Matched 2.7333 2.681 0.0523 0.7946 0.106 
Debt ratio Unmatched 0.3232 0.2083 0.1149*** 0.1817 <.0001 
  Matched 0.3227 0.3295 -0.00682 0.2232 0.4524 
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Table (5.7) reports the difference of the mean size, age, and debt ratio between SIN stocks and 
non-SIN stocks before and after PSM. Other than age in the all SIN sample, the differences in the 
three control variables between each SIN and non-SIN grouping are statistically significant at 1% 
before matching, but this quantity is statistically insignificant after matching. This shows that 
propensity score matching worked well: The matched pairs have a similar distribution of size, age, 
and debt ratio after matching.  
Once we know we have a good matched sample, we do a t-test on the mean difference of each risk 
measure between SIN and its matched non-SIN. The results are in table (5.8). The mean risk 
measures for alcohol and tobacco are always statistically significantly less than for their matched 
non-SIN sample. For alcohol the difference in the mean beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk are 
respectively 0.3832, 0.0288 and 0.0341 less than those of non-SIN stocks. All differences are 
significant at all levels. Similarly, the mean beta for tobacco stocks is 0.4784 less than that of non-
SIN peers, and they have 0.0159 and 0.0241 less idiosyncratic and total volatility, all significant 
at 1%. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in the mean beta for gambling stocks 
between SIN and its matched non-SIN, but gambling stocks have a significantly higher IVOL 
(0.00796, significant at 5%) and TVOL (0.00686, significant at 10%) relative to their non-SIN 
matched sample. However, the magnitude of these differences is small and not economically 
significant. Finally, for the all SIN grouping, beta, IVOL, and TVOL are each significantly less (at 
1%) than their matched counterpart. These results are similar to the SIN vs non-SIN comparisons 
without benefit of PSM (table 5.2) and the regression analysis on the sample of all SINs combined 
(table 5.6). Based on these findings, we can conclude that alcohol and tobacco stocks are generally 
less risky, while gambling stocks have almost the same levels of risk as conventional stocks, on 
average. These findings do not support hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c. 
We also run a panel regression on the matched sample to investigate differences in risk measures 
after controlling for Size, Age, Debt, CapxR, ROA, CashR, Tobin’s Q and Altman Z score. PSM 
used size, age, and debt for matching but to capture any potential information left in size, age, and 
debt, we also include them in the regression. We use fixed effect panel regression since the 
Hausman test (unreported) reflects the presence of fixed effects. The estimates for each SIN group 
can be found in table (5.9), and for the all SIN sample in table (5.10).
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Table 5.8 Propensity Score Matching, t-test on the differences of risk measures 
Table 5.8 exhibits the test of differences in mean of Beta, IVOL, and TVOL between matched 
samples resulting from propensity score matching on Size, Age, and the Debt ratio over the period 
1980-2017. The results are presented in four sections: alcohol stocks, tobacco stocks, gambling 
stocks, and the sample of all SIN stocks. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Alcohol Obs Mean Difference (Alcohol- Non) 
P-value of 
diff 
Beta (Alcohol) 486 0.7986 -0.3832*** <.0001 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.1817   
Idiosyncratic volatility (Alcohol) 486 0.099 -0.0288*** <.0001 
Idiosyncratic volatility (non-SIN)  0.1279   
Total volatility (Alcohol) 486 0.1077 -0.0341*** <.0001 
Total volatility(non-SIN)   0.1418     
Tobacco Obs Mean Difference (Tobacco - non) 
P-value of 
diff 
Beta (Tobacco) 104 0.6733 -0.4784*** <.0001 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.1517   
Idiosyncratic volatility (Tobacco) 104 0.0858 -0.0159*** 0.0017 
Idiosyncratic volatility (non-SIN)  0.0698   
Total volatility (Tobacco) 104 0.0777 -0.0241*** <.0001 
Total volatility(non-SIN)   0.1017     
Gambling Obs Mean 
Difference (Gambling - 
non) 
P-value of 
diff 
Beta (Gambling) 612 1.1758 -0.0264 0.5783 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.2023   
Idiosyncratic volatility (Gambling) 612 0.1463 0.00796** 0.0304 
Idiosyncratic volatility (non-SIN)  0.1383   
Total volatility (Gambling) 612 0.1578 0.00686* 0.0722 
Total volatility(non-SIN)   0.151     
All sins (Alcohol,Tobacco, 
Gambling) Obs Mean Difference (SIN - non) 
P-value of 
diff 
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Beta (SIN) 1208 0.9824 -0.1811*** <.0001 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.1635   
Idiosyncratic volatility (SIN) 1208 0.1205 -0.0124*** <.0001 
Idiosyncratic volatility (non-SIN)  0.133   
Total volatility (SIN) 1208 0.1306 -0.0151*** <.0001 
Total volatility(non-SIN)   0.1457     
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Table 5.9 Panel regression analysis on matched sample of different SIN groups (matched on Size, Age, and the Debt ratio) 
Table 5.9 presents the Panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors on the matched samples 
from Propensity Score Matching on Size, Age, and Debt ratio over the period 1980-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance 
level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 Beta  IVOL  TVOL 
  Alcohol Tobacco Gambling    Alcohol Tobacco Gambling  Alcohol Tobacco Gambling  
D-SIN -0.58188*** 
(0.1531) 
-0.5078*** 
(0.1371) 
0.206655 
(0.1896) 
 -0.03822** 
(0.0172) 
0.008619 
(0.00523) 
0.019485* 
(0.0114) 
 -0.04676*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.00112 
(0.00417) 
0.020618 
(0.0125) 
Size -0.03027 
(0.0266) 
-0.03985 
(0.0286) 
0.15399*** 
(0.0295) 
 -0.0142*** 
(0.00314) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.00180) 
-0.0102*** 
(0.00226) 
 -0.0141*** 
(0.00331) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.00139) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.00258) 
Age  0.039388 
(0.0666) 
0.03563 
(0.0367) 
-0.17736* 
(0.0935) 
 0.0017 
(0.00532) 
0.00287** 
(0.00139) 
-0.0089 
(0.00534) 
 0.00186 
(0.00562) 
0.00262** 
(0.00127) 
-0.0122** 
(0.00587) 
Debt ratio 0.02864 
(0.2780) 
0.18762 
(0.3585) 
0.260616 
(0.1956) 
 0.01566 
(0.0271) 
-0.0506*** 
(0.0187) 
0.077024*** 
(0.0128) 
 0.015226 
(0.0287) 
-0.0461*** 
(0.0146) 
0.078119*** 
(0.0130) 
CapxR 0.513034 
(0.7243) 
-0.76814 
(0.9521) 
-0.1646 
(0.5286) 
 0.01497 
(0.0496) 
-0.02819 
(0.0852) 
-0.02377 
(0.0273) 
 0.014394 
(0.0524) 
-0.04048 
(0.0730) 
-0.02954 
(0.0266) 
ROA -0.26426 
(0.4409) 
-0.25965 
(0.4286) 
-0.40194* 
(0.4272) 
 -0.0904** 
(0.0379) 
-0.0932*** 
(0.0320) 
-0.18609*** 
(0.0272) 
 -0.08754** 
(0.0397) 
-0.0951*** 
(0.0251) 
-0.1876*** 
(0.0285) 
CashR 0.631562* 
(0.3572) 
-0.68596 
(0.4895) 
-0.33999*** 
(0.3728) 
 0.022679 
(0.0220) 
0.01875 
(0.0304) 
0.07236*** 
(0.0271) 
 0.025376 
(0.0247) 
0.00537 
(0.0219) 
0.067781** 
(0.0275) 
Tobin's Q 0.004379 
(0.0356) 
-0.02696 
(0.0745) 
0.107101** 
(0.0451) 
 0.001585* 
(0.00266) 
0.0092 
(0.00621) 
0.00534*** 
(0.00205) 
 0.001446 
(0.00282) 
0.008948* 
(0.00487) 
0.00694** 
(0.00211) 
Altman Z -0.00633 
(0.00499) 
0.032677 
(0.0248) 
0.0008*** 
(0.000278) 
 -0.00098** 
(0.000456) 
-0.0036* 
(0.00180) 
0.000019 
(0.000018) 
 -0.00105** 
(0.000453) 
-0.00294** 
(0.00140) 
0.00003* 
(0.00002) 
4
9
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_Cons 1.22589*** 
(0.2711) 
1.1889*** 
(0.3784) 
0.053983 
(0.3935) 
 0.2285*** 
(0.0219) 
0.1239*** 
(0.0204) 
0.14299*** 
(0.0253) 
 0.23835*** 
(0.0226) 
0.13463*** 
(0.0161) 
0.135988*** 
(0.0269) 
                        
Year fixed effect 
included 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
P-value F-test 
for no fixed 
effect 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
R-squared 0.2148*** 0.6561*** 0.3781***  0.536*** 0.8543*** 0.4968***  0.5052*** 0.8844*** 0.4695*** 
Obs 726 174 896   726 174 896   726 174 896 
5
0
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Table 5.10 Panel regression analysis on matched sample of all SIN stocks (matched on Size, 
Age, and the Debt ratio) 
Table 5.10 presents the Panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust 
standard errors on the matched samples resulted from Propensity Score Matching on Size, Age, 
and the Debt ratio over the period 1980-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance 
level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the 
estimated coefficients. 
 Beta  IVOL  TVOL 
  All SIN   All SIN   All SIN 
D-SIN -0.56549*** 
(0.2066) 
 -0.02188 
(0.0155) 
 -0.03171* 
(0.0184) 
size 0.040158** 
(0.0203) 
 -0.01126*** 
(0.00142) 
 -0.01016*** 
(0.00160) 
age  -0.16153*** 
(0.0510) 
 -0.01005*** 
(0.00296) 
 -0.01234*** 
(0.00334) 
debt ratio 0.6998*** 
(0.1402) 
 0.076532*** 
(0.00920) 
 0.084026*** 
(0.00964) 
CapxR 0.391452 
(0.4933) 
 0.026014 
(0.0261) 
 0.028776 
(0.0260) 
ROA -0.37185 
(0.2434) 
 -0.12048*** 
(0.0175) 
 -0.11975*** 
(0.0183) 
cashR 0.596347*** 
(0.2212) 
 0.038662*** 
(0.0149) 
 0.042587*** 
(0.0163) 
Tobin's Q 0.048222** 
(0.0240) 
 0.0053*** 
(0.0015) 
 0.005613*** 
(0.00162) 
Altman Z 0.00103*** 
(0.00023) 
 0.000044*** 
(0.000012) 
 0.000056*** 
(0.000014) 
_Cons 1.186724*** 
(0.2798) 
 0.193997*** 
(0.0198) 
 0.203759*** 
(0.0225) 
Year fixed effect 
included 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
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P-value F-test for no 
fixed effect 
<.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
R-squared 0.2762***  0.4977***  0.4724*** 
Obs 1788   1788   1788 
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Table (5.9) shows that alcohol and tobacco shares have statistically lower (at 1%) market betas 
than non-SIN matched pairs with coefficients of -0.5819 and -0.5078, respectively and the beta for 
gambling stocks is not statistically different. The idiosyncratic volatility for alcohol stocks is 
significantly less (-0.03822, significant at 5%) than that of the matched non-SIN firms, but the 
relevant difference is positive for gambling stocks (0.01949, significant at 10%) and insignificant 
for tobacco. Total volatility for alcohol stocks are on average 0.0468 less than their non-SIN 
counterparts, yet the estimates for tobacco and gambling are insignificant, suggesting that there is 
no difference in their total risk compared with matched conventional stocks. Thus, when we refine 
our non-SIN comparator group and do fixed effects estimation, we continue to find a lack of 
support for the first three hypotheses (H1a, H1b, and H1c) with one weak exception (idiosyncratic 
risk of gambling firms). Although we do match the SIN stocks based on size, age, and debt and 
observe that the quality of matching is appropriate, we still witness instances of significant 
coefficient estimates on these three variables in the regression. The PSM outcomes for SIN versus 
non-SIN stocks are comparable to the results in table (5.5), except, in general, the coefficient 
estimates are larger in the case of the matched samples.  
For the all SIN stock sample (table 5.10), the estimates of the SIN dummy for beta and total 
volatility are -0.5655 (significant at 1%) and -0.03171 (significant at 10%), respectively. Being a 
SIN stock has no significant impact on idiosyncratic volatility for the matched sample. Once more, 
we conclude that SIN stocks involve less systematic risk, while other risk measures are not 
different, or very close to those for conventional stocks. This contradicts Jo and Na (2012), Cai et 
al. (2012), Oh et al. (2017), and Guillamón-Saorín et al. (2018) who assume that the SIN stocks 
are riskier due to the nature of their business. Thus, regardless of method, our data supports less 
systematic risk for SIN stocks. Further, in isolated instances where IVOL or TVOL is greater, the 
magnitudes are not economically significant. 
5.4 Regression analysis in different periods  
The existing literature assumes SIN stocks are riskier than non-SIN, but our results do not support 
this assumption for the 1980-2017 period. To examine how the risk of SIN stocks has changed 
over time, we split our original sample period into two intervals: 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. 
Similar to the previous sections, we do a fixed effects panel regression analysis on the matched 
sample of SIN groups from propensity score matching on Size, Age, and the Debt ratio.
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Table 5.11 Regression analysis on different sample periods for the sample of all SINs 
Table 5.11 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the all SIN combined group over two periods: 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
All SINs 
Beta   IVOL  TVOL 
1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017 
D-SIN 0.077972 
(0.0653) 
-0.25068*** 
(0.0932)  
0.011985*** 
(0.00447) 
-0.01813** 
(0.00733)  
0.011818** 
(0.00467) 
-0.02086*** 
(0.0078) 
Size 0.064338*** 
(0.0188) 
0.014838 
(0.0227)  
-0.01199*** 
(0.00123) 
-0.01116*** 
(0.00169)  
-0.01058*** 
(0.00125) 
-0.01034*** 
(0.00187) 
Age  -0.15093*** 
(0.0436) 
-0.10687 
(0.065)  
-0.00944*** 
(0.00264) 
-0.01035*** 
(0.00398)  
-0.01146*** 
(0.00265) 
-0.01196*** 
(0.00435) 
Debt ratio 0.174362 
(0.1849) 
1.05738*** 
(0.1905)   
0.065794*** 
(0.0126) 
0.067241*** 
(0.0141)  
0.066017*** 
(0.0126) 
0.081321*** 
(0.0149) 
CapxR 0.39197 
(0.5708) 
1.350424** 
(0.5779)  
0.035342 
(0.0283) 
0.04043 
(0.038)  
0.036342 
(0.0263) 
0.055032 
(0.0407) 
ROA -0.223 
(0.3266) 
-1.01489** 
(0.4422)  
-0.11107*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.08589*** 
(0.0325)  
-0.1094*** 
(0.0146) 
-0.09877*** 
(0.0352) 
CashR 0.44866 
(0.3358) 
0.637982** 
(0.2964)  
0.06597*** 
(0.019) 
0.044773** 
(0.0219)  
0.069028*** 
(0.0202) 
0.051812** 
(0.0224) 
Tobin's Q 0.051634 
(0.0379) 
-0.00975 
(0.032)  
0.006546*** 
(0.00154) 
0.002962 
(0.00249)  
0.00747*** 
(0.00139) 
0.002268 
(0.0026) 
5
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Altman Z 0.000809*** 
(0.000234) 
0.027* 
(0.0158)  
0.000044*** 
(0.000013) 
-0.00224* 
(0.00123)  
0.000052*** 
(0.000013) 
-0.00167 
(0.00133) 
_Cons 0.585669*** 
(0.1744) 
0.823413*** 
(0.2372)  
0.181515*** 
(0.0102) 
0.198944*** 
(0.0172)  
0.182956*** 
(0.0103) 
0.199751*** 
(0.0179) 
                
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0995*** 0.3147***  0.5898*** 0.4098***  0.565*** 0.404*** 
Obs 702 906   702 906  702 906 
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We begin our investigation with the sample of all SINs and report the outcomes in table (5.11). 
The results for beta indicate that the systematic risk of SIN stocks is less relative to the matched 
non-SIN in the second half of our period. For example, we find that the SIN dummy is insignificant 
and positive (0.078) for 1980-1998, but it is significant (at 1%) and negatively related to beta           
(-0.251) from 1999 to 2017. The results for IVOL and TVOL show that SIN stocks were riskier in 
1980-1998 (0.012 and 0.012, respectively), but they become less risky than the non-SIN matched 
sample in the second period (-0.018 and -0.021, respectively). Each of these coefficients is 
significant at 5% or 10%. Thus, the impact of SIN on risk measures is sensitive to time and risk 
metric. This may partially reconcile our findings with those concentrating on earlier time periods. 
Although the impact of SIN on risk is less, the controls do not display any shift in their impact on 
risk over time. 
We also investigate the time sensitivity of each SIN group separately. Table (5.12) exhibits the 
fixed effects panel regression estimates of the alcohol versus matched non-SIN sample. We 
observe that alcohol stocks have significantly less Beta, IVOL, and TVOL relative to their non-
SIN matched pairs, regardless of the time period. Further, the absolute value of the alcohol impact 
for all risk measures has become higher in the more recent subsample, suggesting that the alcohol 
group has become less risky in 1999-2017 relative to 1980-1998. For example, estimates change 
from -0.48618 to -0.56622 for Beta, from -0.011 to -0.05507 for IVOL, and from -0.01975 to            
-0.06434 for TVOL.  
Table (5.13) presents the results for the tobacco group. In the first sub-period the risk is not 
statistically different between the tobacco and non-tobacco matched firms regardless of the risk 
measurement. In sharp contrast, all tobacco risk measures are significant in the second half. The 
estimates for Beta (-0.87382), IVOL (0.017194), and TVOL (-0.00884) show that being a tobacco 
stock significantly reduced systematic  and total risk but increased idiosyncratic risk in the second 
subperiod. Finally, table (5.14) demonstrates that the impact of being in the gambling sector is 
positive and significant at 5% or better from 1980-1998 for all risk measures (0.451 for Beta, 0.028 
for IVOL, and 0.032 for TVOL), yet it has no significant relationship with the three risk measures 
from 1999-2017. Thus, being a gambling stock significantly increased risk, relative to the matched 
sample, before 1998 but not in the second subperiod. This finding is consistent with the Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) observation that the gambling industry has gradually become more socially 
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acceptable since the late 1990s due to the deregulation of gambling activities in an increasing 
number of US states.
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Table 5.12 Regression analysis on different sample periods for matched sample of the alcohol group 
Table 5.12 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the alcohol group over two periods: 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.  Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
Alcohol 
Beta   IVOL  TVOL 
1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017 
D-alcohol -0.48618*** 
(0.0986) 
-0.56622*** 
(0.152)  
-0.011** 
(0.00531) 
-0.05507*** 
(0.0158)  
-0.01975*** 
(0.00587) 
-0.06434*** 
(0.0168) 
Size 0.018502 
(0.0297) 
-0.08809** 
(0.0377)  
-0.01014*** 
(0.00133) 
-0.01328*** 
(0.00474)  
-0.0096*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.01385*** 
(0.00501) 
Age  -0.06976 
(0.072) 
0.297527*** 
(0.1108)  
-0.00152 
(0.0028) 
-0.00264 
(0.0114)  
-0.00285 
(0.00325) 
0.001345 
(0.012) 
Debt ratio -0.19947 
(0.2633) 
0.706554* 
(0.4)  
0.019601 
(0.014) 
-0.0323 
(0.0496)  
0.013073 
(0.0152) 
-0.01816 
(0.0515) 
CapxR -0.10069 
(1.0355) 
0.885145 
(0.9786)  
0.04784 
(0.0346) 
-0.06102 
(0.0846)  
0.04237 
(0.0419) 
-0.04489 
(0.0902) 
ROA 0.11962 
(0.612) 
-2.19532*** 
(0.5864)   
-0.14104*** 
(0.0366) 
-0.1167*** 
(0.0409)  
-0.13373*** 
(0.0343) 
-0.14902*** 
(0.0445) 
CashR 0.970113** 
(0.4786) 
0.626747* 
(0.3297)  
0.057894*** 
(0.0165) 
-0.05947** 
(0.0288)  
0.066611*** 
(0.022) 
-0.05463* 
(0.0293) 
Tobin's Q 0.116019 
(0.0873) 
-0.05064 
(0.037)  
0.00439 
(0.00393) 
0.010181*** 
(0.00347)  
0.008342** 
(0.00375) 
0.008642** 
(0.00367) 
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Altman Z -0.0105 
(0.00683) 
0.05624*** 
(0.0188)  
-0.00088*** 
(0.000227) 
-0.00307** 
(0.00119)  
-0.00104*** 
(0.000314) 
-0.00208 
(0.00132) 
_Cons 1.207347*** 
(0.2351) 
0.680535** 
(0.3322)  
0.185908*** 
(0.0113) 
0.264336*** 
(0.0259)  
0.19767*** 
(0.0122) 
0.265642*** 
(0.0265) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1909*** 0.3431***  0.6922*** 0.5152***  0.6243*** 0.5*** 
Obs 301 341   301 341  301 341 
5
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Table 5.13 Regression analysis on different sample periods for matched sample of the tobacco group 
Table 5.13 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the tobacco group over two periods: 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
Tobacco 
Beta   IVOL  TVOL 
1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017 
D-tobacco -0.08189 
(0.1772) 
-0.87382*** 
(0.0991)  
0.005406 
(0.0074) 
0.017194*** 
(0.00336)  
0.004805 
(0.00771) 
-0.00884* 
(0.00475) 
Size -0.02564 
(0.0249) 
0.121342*** 
(0.0299)  
-0.00821*** 
(0.00147) 
-0.00499*** 
(0.00134)  
-0.00811*** 
(0.00143) 
-0.00047 
(0.00169) 
Age  -0.70181* 
(0.3702) 
0.000433 
(0.0236)  
0.009469 
(0.02) 
-0.00081 
(0.00116)  
-0.0115 
(0.0213) 
-0.0022 
(0.00182) 
Debt ratio -0.01275 
(0.6368) 
-0.64673** 
(0.2686)  
-0.04159 
(0.0299) 
-0.00539 
(0.0129)  
-0.04141 
(0.0287) 
-0.02653 
(0.0194) 
CapxR 2.745708*** 
(0.8035) 
-0.80892 
(2.7059)  
0.026013 
(0.0484) 
0.146534 
(0.097)  
0.083181* 
(0.048) 
0.064888 
(0.1473) 
ROA -0.40912 
(0.4206) 
3.245701*** 
(0.5374)  
-0.11583*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.03299* 
(0.0181)  
-0.12186*** 
(0.0228) 
0.072311** 
(0.0307) 
CashR -0.48485* 
(0.287) 
0.476452 
(0.3108)  
0.007456 
(0.0206) 
0.012113 
(0.0194)  
0.005523 
(0.0175) 
0.028474 
(0.0196) 
Tobin's Q -0.04887 
(0.096) 
0.145576** 
(0.064)  
0.00977* 
(0.00497) 
-0.00575** 
(0.00272)  
0.009958** 
(0.00405) 
-0.00269 
(0.00418) 
6
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Altman Z 0.037409 
(0.0376) 
-0.26636*** 
(0.0626)  
-0.00262 
(0.00163) 
0.001887 
(0.00202)  
-0.00226 
(0.00142) 
-0.00481 
(0.00371) 
_Cons 3.879569** 
(1.5086) 
0.374867 
(0.3134)  
0.144052* 
(0.0774) 
0.106558*** 
(0.0145)  
0.233407*** 
(0.0834) 
0.099318*** 
(0.0163) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.5995*** 0.7407***  0.7633*** 0.5542***  0.6571*** 0.5703*** 
Obs 81 70   81 70  81 70 
6
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Table 5.14 Regression analysis on different sample periods for matched sample of the gambling group 
Table 5.14 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the tobacco group over two periods: 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
Gambling 
Beta   IVOL  TVOL 
1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017   1980-1998 1999-2017 
D-gambling 0.450749** 
(0.191) 
-0.01177 
(0.1547)  
0.028408*** 
(0.0108) 
0.004384 
(0.00886)  
0.031708*** 
(0.0107) 
0.005423 
(0.0105) 
Size 0.127958*** 
(0.0388) 
0.135105*** 
(0.036)  
-0.01447*** 
(0.00271) 
-0.00888*** 
(0.00291)  
-0.01276*** 
(0.00266) 
-0.00595* 
(0.00334) 
Age  -0.05805 
(0.1171) 
-0.18456* 
(0.1019)  
-0.00823 
(0.0066) 
-0.00072 
(0.00858)  
-0.00799 
(0.0065) 
-0.00448 
(0.00929) 
Debt ratio 0.144209 
(0.2946) 
0.691353*** 
(0.2275)  
0.057553*** 
(0.0177) 
0.087246*** 
(0.0178)  
0.059562*** 
(0.0173) 
0.090941*** 
(0.0191) 
CapxR -0.15053 
(0.6167) 
-0.19824 
(0.6523)  
-0.01523 
(0.0318) 
-0.05908 
(0.0384)  
-0.0188 
(0.0288) 
-0.06252 
(0.0435) 
ROA -0.20641 
(0.5797) 
-1.4925** 
(0.6095)   
-0.15656*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.2118*** 
(0.0447)  
-0.14911*** 
(0.032) 
-0.23087*** 
(0.0494) 
CashR -0.63462 
(0.5442) 
0.07408 
(0.4369)  
0.064068* 
(0.034) 
0.112886*** 
(0.0325)  
0.057818* 
(0.033) 
0.110838*** 
(0.0363) 
Tobin's Q 0.098326* 
(0.0528) 
0.144498** 
(0.0663)  
0.002159 
(0.00221) 
0.014627*** 
(0.00382)  
0.00371* 
(0.00199) 
0.016661*** 
(0.00439) 
6
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Altman Z 0.000816*** 
(0.000269) 
0.02621 
(0.0224)  
0.000022 
(0.00002) 
-0.00275 
(0.00179)  
0.000032* 
(0.000019) 
-0.00243 
(0.00193) 
_cons -0.26106 
(0.4374) 
0.006827 
(0.4245)  
0.206742*** 
(0.0229) 
0.116953*** 
(0.0367)  
0.19641*** 
(0.0228) 
0.107351*** 
(0.0399) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-square 0.1413*** 0.5404***  0.5291*** 0.4824***  0.5143*** 0.4629*** 
Obs 322 425   322 425  322 425 
6
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These outcomes illustrate the importance of disaggregating the SIN categories and examining the 
time sensitivity of their risks. Alcohol has less systematic, idiosyncratic, and total risk relative to 
their non-SIN counterparts, regardless of time period. Tobacco stocks have reduced beta and total 
risk but increased idiosyncratic risk over time. Further, the elevated risk reputation associated with 
SIN stocks can be largely attributed to gambling stocks and this has also changed over time: The 
impact of being classified as a gambling firm had a significantly positive impact on risk from 1980-
1998 but no impact from 1999-2017.  
5.5 Discussion  
Many studies argue that inherent business characteristics cause SIN stocks to be riskier than non-
SIN stocks. Hong and Kacperczyck (2009) state that companies involved in alcohol, tobacco, and 
gambling are widely neglected by investors due to social norms, are more exposed to litigation 
risk, and hence have higher idiosyncratic risk and a higher risk-adjusted return. Based on Hong 
and Kacperczyck (2009), a series of papers also assume that SIN stocks are riskier but none of 
these studies explicitly quantifies and analyzes risk (Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Oh et al., 
2017; and Guillamón-Saorín et al., 2018). Our study calculates beta, idiosyncratic and total risks 
and finds that alcohol and tobacco stocks have less beta, idiosyncratic volatility and total volatility 
while gambling stocks have similar risk levels compared to their non-SIN pairs. Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) state that the gambling industry has gradually become more socially acceptable 
since mid-to-late 1990s as more US-states have started deregulating gambling activities. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that gambling stocks do not show different risks relative to 
conventional stocks. Finally, the sample of all SIN stocks demonstrates that, regardless of risk 
measure, risk is not greater for SIN stocks relative to their matched non-SIN sample. This contrasts 
with the prevailing assumption that SIN companies are riskier than non-SIN firms (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Oh et al., 2017; Guillamón-Saorín et al., 
2018). Therefore, we reject hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c. Our results are robust to using different 
approaches including regression analysis on an unmatched sample, Propensity Score Matching, 
and regression analysis on the matched sample of SIN stocks. 
The existing literature maintains that SIN companies are more prone to litigation risk relative to 
their non-SIN counterparts (Salaber, 2007; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Due to the nature of their 
business, SIN companies may encounter higher litigation exposure and consequently costs of legal 
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experts and punitive damage costs of lawsuits. This higher litigation risk might imply higher risk 
for SIN stocks, which is contrary to our results. On the other hand, Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) 
argue that SIN companies benefit from higher earning quality and lower information risk compared 
to their control firms because SIN companies have an incentive to present a better self-image to 
prevent being neglected by the market. It has been shown that information risk has a positive 
association with stock risk and stocks with higher information risk (poor earning quality) have 
higher volatility (Chen, Huang, and Jha, 2012). Alam, et al. (2015) support this idea and belief that 
as earning quality increases, idiosyncratic and total volatility decrease. Our results are consistent 
with the information risk hypothesis. We suspect that the impact of information risk on SIN stocks 
dominates the effect of higher litigation risk. 
There are several additional explanations to reconcile the differences between our results and those 
in the existing literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this research is the first one in the SIN 
area to use propensity score matching to more carefully isolate the impact of being classified as a 
SIN firm on risk. Second, this study is also the first one that excludes grey stocks. Previous studies 
included grey stocks in their SIN or conventional stock samples, but we maintain that grey stocks 
should be excluded from both because they are not necessarily universally accepted as SIN and 
are only circumstantially considered unethical by investors (Byrne, 2010). This necessitates a 
careful SIN versus non-SIN selection, especially when we observed from table (3.2) that grey 
stocks contain approximately 90% of the total SIN sample. 
Third, unlike previous studies that investigate SIN companies collectively, we study each SIN 
category separately to fully understand how the risk of each SIN grouping is different relative to 
its non-SIN matched sample. Gambling stocks have gradually attracted more social acceptance 
over the time, while the tobacco and alcohol industries are still considered to be in conflict with 
the goals of public health policies. We observed from table (3.2) that gambling stocks account for 
51% of our (triumvirate) SIN sample, while tobacco stocks comprise only 9% of the sample. This 
implies that the gambling group might drive the results and thus studying SIN stocks collectively 
could give us a misleading picture of SIN risk. 
Fourth, the time period covered in the research has a key role to play as illustrated by our results 
in section 5.4 and tables 5.11 to 5.14. For example, for the sample of All SIN stocks, which is the 
aggregated category used by prior studies, we find that SIN stocks were riskier (IVOL and TVOL) 
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in 1980-1998 but they became less risky than the non-SIN matched sample in the second period. 
Therefore, if the time period studied corresponds to the first sub-period (1980-1998), such as Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009) and Kim and Venkatachalam (2011), it is not surprising that they find SIN 
stocks to be riskier. In addition, by disaggregating the SIN types, we see that gambling stocks, as 
the largest component of the SIN sample, may account for these results. 
5.6 CSR inclusion in the regression analysis of matched samples 
The existing literature treats CSR as a practical approach to reduce risk for all stocks (Lee and 
Faff, 2009; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Guiral, 2012). Bansal and Clelland (2004) and Godfrey 
(2005) believe that CSR acts as moral capital and provides protection for companies in an adverse 
event. Engagement in CSR activities enhances stakeholders’ satisfaction and can lead to a better 
corporate reputation among stakeholders (Orlitzky et al., 2003), decrease volatility in firm’s future 
cash flows (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006), decrease systematic risk (Jo and Na, 2012; Monti, et al., 
2019), idiosyncratic risk (Godfrey, 2005; Lee and Faff, 2009; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; 
Bouslah et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2018), and total risk (Jo and Na, 2012; Bouslah et al., 2013; Monti 
et al., 2019). 
To investigate the role of CSR in mitigating risk in SIN versus non-SIN stocks, we include the 
MSCI KLD CSR scores in our model. For each company, MSCI KLD assigns several strengths 
and concerns along different dimensions to assess its social performance. Since the MSCI KLD 
information is only available from 1991 to 2013, we narrow our sample from 1980-2017 to 1991-
2013. We calculate the CSR score as total strengths minus total concerns in MSCI KLD’s six 
dimensions: Community, Corporate governance, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, and 
Product. Each strength adds one point to the CSR score and each concern subtracts one point. 
Following Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) and Guillamón-Saorín, et al. (2018), we standardize all 
scores to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across each year to simplify the 
interpretation of coefficients (CSR z-score). We do regression analysis on the matched samples 
(from propensity score matching on Size, Age, and the Debt ratio) with the lagged CSR z-score 
and the interaction of the SIN dummy with the lagged CSR z-score included. Following Bouslah 
et al. (2013) and Kim et al. (2014), we impose a one-year lag between the CSR z-score (in year t-
1) and risk measure (in year t) to ensure that the impact of CSR is properly absorbed.  To test our 
hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c, we rely on multivariate regression analysis of equation (5.1): 
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𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅_𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                         (5.1) 
Where the dependent variables (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡) are i) beta, ii) idiosyncratic volatility, or iii) total 
volatility , 𝐷_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑡 is dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the alcohol, tobacco, or 
gambling industries (depending on the category it could be D-alcohol, D-tobacco, D-gambling, or 
D-SIN) and zero otherwise, 𝐶𝑆𝑅_𝑍𝑡−1 is the lagged CSR z-score, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is firm size, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the 
firm age, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑡 is the debt ratio, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑡 is capital expenditure ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is return on assets, 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑡 is Cash and short-term investments ratio, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑡 is firm’s Tobin’s Q, and 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑍𝑡 is 
the Altman Z score.
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Table 5.15 CSR inclusion in regression analysis on the matched sample of the alcohol group 
Table 5.15 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the alcohol group over the period 1991-2013. We use three different risk measures as the dependent variable: Beta as the beta of 
individual stocks in the current year, based on monthly stock returns over five years using market model, IVOL as the standard deviation 
of residuals in the current year from market model, using monthly stock returns over five years, and TVOL as the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns in current year. D_alcohol is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the alcohol group and zero 
otherwise. We define CSR z-score as the CSR score, by aggregating total strengths minus total concerns for each of the MSCI’s six 
social rating categories (community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product) converted into z-
scores, Size as logarithm of total assets, Age as the logarithm of one plus number of years since the first trading date on CRSP, Debt 
ratio as the Book value of debt divided by total assets, CapxR as the capital expenditure expenses divided by total assets, ROA as the 
Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, CashR as the cash and short-term investments divided by total assets, 
Tobin's Q as the market value of common equity plus total assets minus total value of equity divided by total assets, and Altman Z as 
Altman Z score (1993) measured as 3.3EBIT + sales + 1.4 retained earnings + 1.2 working capital divided by total assets. ***, **, and 
* stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the 
estimated coefficients.  
 Beta  IVOL  TVOL 
  (1) Alcohol (2) Alcohol   (1) Alcohol (2) Alcohol   (1) Alcohol (2) Alcohol 
D-alcohol -0.09246 
(0.1109) 
-0.08792 
(0.1195)  
-0.0133*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.00954** 
(0.00464)  
-0.01521** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0117* 
(0.00599) 
CSR -0.06445** 
(0.0286) 
-0.05824 
(0.0594)  
-0.00136 
(0.00111) 
0.003799 
(0.00237)  
-0.00306** 
(0.00152) 
0.001736 
(0.0031) 
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D-alcohol *CSR 
 
-0.00707 
(0.0673)   
-0.00587** 
(0.00274)   
-0.00546 
(0.00364) 
Size -0.15571** 
(0.0751) 
-0.15575** 
(0.0751)  
-0.0196*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.01962*** 
(0.00301)  
-0.02254*** 
(0.00422) 
-0.02258*** 
(0.00414) 
Age  0.363686*** 
(0.1308) 
0.36434*** 
(0.1319)  
0.008756* 
(0.00462) 
'0.009298** 
(0.00455)  
0.017793*** 
(0.00669) 
0.018298*** 
(0.00665) 
Debt ratio 0.003257 
(0.4581) 
0.005026 
(0.4597)  
-0.03924** 
(0.0175) 
-0.03777** 
(0.0172)  
-0.02919 
(0.0231) 
-0.02783 
(0.023) 
CapxR -1.89924* 
(1.0987) 
-1.8952* 
(1.0992)  
-0.01209 
(0.0444) 
-0.00874 
(0.0438)  
-0.04556 
(0.0571) 
-0.04244 
(0.057) 
ROA -2.48335*** 
(0.5114) 
-2.4889*** 
(0.5174)  
-0.06712** 
(0.0299) 
-0.07176** 
(0.0294)  
-0.09715*** 
(0.0348) 
-0.10146*** 
(0.0344) 
CashR -0.35012 
(0.5268) 
-0.35163 
(0.5275)  
-0.0693*** 
(0.0246) 
-0.07054*** 
(0.0237)  
-0.0736** 
(0.0312) 
-0.07477** 
(0.0305) 
Tobin's Q -0.04066 
(0.0758) 
-0.04066 
(0.0757)  
0.005481* 
(0.00329) 
0.005487* 
(0.00324)  
0.004143 
(0.00433) 
0.004148 
(0.0043) 
Altman Z 0.060479** 
(0.0303) 
0.060572** 
(0.0304)  
-0.00414** 
(0.00165) 
-0.00406** 
(0.00164)  
-0.00309* 
(0.00185) 
-0.00302 
(0.00184) 
_Cons 1.522295*** 
(0.5548) 
1.51756*** 
(0.5496)   
1.51756*** 
(0.5496) 
0.261945*** 
(0.0255)  
0.281483*** 
(0.0301) 
0.277826*** 
(0.0299) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.5765*** 0.5766***  0.8582*** 0.8615***  0.815*** 0.8172*** 
Obs 170 170   170 170   170 170 
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Table 5.16 CSR inclusion in regression analysis on the matched sample of the tobacco group  
Table 5.16 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the tobacco group over the period 1991-2013. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 Beta  IVOL  TVOL 
  (1) Tobacco (2) Tobacco   (1) Tobacco (2) Tobacco   (1) Tobacco (2) Tobacco 
D-tobacco -0.68051*** 
(0.1771) 
-0.63313*** 
(0.1518)  
0.02279 
(0.0148) 
0.024129 
(0.0146)  
0.006445 
(0.0137) 
0.008777 
(0.013) 
CSR -0.02988 
(0.0247) 
-0.1561*** 
(0.0438)  
0.001156 
(0.00186) 
-0.00241 
(0.00285)  
0.000648 
(0.00175) 
-0.00557* 
(0.00283) 
D-tobacco *CSR 
 
0.154673*** 
(0.0484)   
0.004374 
(0.00345)   
0.007617** 
(0.00344) 
Size 0.14726*** 
(0.0347) 
0.102649*** 
(0.0311)  
-0.00404 
(0.00394) 
-0.0053 
(0.00444)  
0.000075 
(0.00397) 
-0.00212 
(0.00445) 
Age  -0.03398 
(0.0395) 
-0.04305 
(0.0396)  
-0.00103 
(0.00435) 
-0.00129 
(0.00421)  
-0.00425 
(0.00406) 
-0.0047 
(0.0038) 
Debt ratio -0.13142 
(0.2643) 
-0.08672 
(0.2572)  
-0.02014 
(0.0229) 
-0.01887 
(0.023)  
-0.01498 
(0.0205) 
-0.01278 
(0.0203) 
CapxR -0.55964 
(3.4225) 
-0.84533 
(2.7845)   
0.783007*** 
(0.2817) 
0.774928*** 
(0.2861)  
0.756417*** 
(0.2576) 
0.742347*** 
(0.2569) 
ROA -0.09509 
(0.5179) 
-0.2916 
(0.4398)  
-0.01858 
(0.0419) 
-0.02414 
(0.0445)  
-0.02573 
(0.0368) 
-0.03541 
(0.0393) 
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CashR 0.972517 
(0.6359) 
0.786194 
(0.5605)  
0.023972 
(0.0563) 
0.018703 
(0.0557)  
0.038404 
(0.0518) 
0.029228 
(0.0497) 
Tobin's Q 0.208547*** 
(0.0633) 
0.220733*** 
(0.059)  
-0.00816* 
(0.00472) 
-0.00781 
(0.00484)  
-0.00348 
(0.00387) 
-0.00288 
(0.00388) 
Altman Z -0.02131 
(0.0177) 
-0.02485 
(0.0166)  
-0.00008 
(0.00128) 
-0.00018 
(0.00133)  
-0.00015 
(0.00101) 
-0.00033 
(0.00105) 
_Cons -0.68517 
(0.4579) 
-0.25184 
(0.4164)  
0.112049** 
(0.0456) 
0.124304** 
(0.0502)  
0.091053* 
(0.0453) 
0.112393** 
(0.0495) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7378*** 0.7674***  0.3275*** 0.3359***  0.3351*** 0.3648*** 
Obs 90 90   90 90   90 90 
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Table 5.17 CSR inclusion in regression analysis on the matched sample of the gambling group 
Table 5.17 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the gambling group over the period 1991-2013. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 Beta  IVOL  TVOL 
  (1) Gambling (2) Gambling   (1) Gambling (2) Gambling   (1) Gambling (2) Gambling 
D-gambling 0.080003 
(0.2455) 
0.102819 
(0.2525)  
0.002499 
(0.0143) 
0.005217 
(0.0135)  
0.002785 
(0.0173) 
0.005739 
(0.0166) 
CSR -0.0429 
(0.0423) 
-0.10819 
(0.1631)  
-0.00351 
(0.003) 
-0.01129 
(0.0119)  
-0.00376 
(0.00349) 
-0.01221 
(0.0127) 
D-gambling *CSR 
 
0.071017 
(0.1652)   
0.00846 
(0.0122)   
0.009197 
(0.013) 
Size 0.118448* 
(0.0662) 
0.120159* 
(0.066)  
-0.00624 
(0.00649) 
-0.00604 
(0.0064)  
-0.00227 
(0.00718) 
-0.00204 
(0.00709) 
Age  -0.24322 
(0.172) 
-0.24618 
(0.1708)  
0.012708 
(0.0129) 
0.012356 
(0.0127)  
0.007241 
(0.015) 
0.006858 
(0.0149) 
Debt ratio 1.042926*** 
(0.3168) 
1.044305*** 
(0.3197)  
0.13477*** 
(0.0269) 
0.134934*** 
(0.0271)  
0.142119*** 
(0.0302) 
0.142298*** 
(0.0304) 
CapxR 0.154841 
(0.892) 
0.15144 
(0.8911)  
-0.07927 
(0.0654) 
-0.07967 
(0.0653)  
-0.07475 
(0.0738) 
-0.07519 
(0.0737) 
ROA -3.04332* 
(1.8205) 
-3.03271* 
(1.8179)  
-0.32494** 
(0.1389) 
-0.32367** 
(0.1379)  
-0.3425** 
(0.1566) 
-0.34112** 
(0.1557) 
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CashR 2.471002* 
(1.4828) 
2.406875 
(1.4759)  
0.217465** 
(0.0982) 
0.209826** 
(0.0957)  
0.263481** 
(0.1178) 
0.255176** 
(0.1154) 
Tobin's Q 0.098521 
(0.1217) 
0.094874 
(0.1215)  
0.011276 
(0.0131) 
0.010842 
(0.0128)  
0.010908 
(0.0141) 
0.010436 
(0.0138) 
Altman Z 0.029654 
(0.0369) 
0.031467 
(0.0367)  
0.001718 
(0.00456) 
0.001934 
(0.00448)  
0.002176 
(0.00485) 
0.002411 
(0.00477) 
_Cons 1.182992 
(0.8108) 
1.160538 
(0.8134)  
0.10396* 
(0.062) 
0.101286 
(0.0614)  
0.108977 
(0.0713) 
0.10607 
(0.0707) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.495*** 0.4953***  0.3417*** 0.3428***  0.3864*** 0.3874*** 
Obs 221 221   221 221   221 221 
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Table 5.18 CSR inclusion in regression analysis on the matched sample of the all SIN group 
Table 5.18 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors for the matched sample 
of the all SIN combined group over the period 1991-2013. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 Beta  IVOL  TVOL 
  (1) All SINs (2) All SINs   (1) All SINs (2) All SINs   (1) All SINs (2) All SINs 
D-SIN -0.03198 
(0.1106) 
-0.02321 
(0.1114)  
0.003109 
(0.00623) 
0.003232 
(0.00635)  
0.002096 
(0.00767) 
0.002286 
(0.00781) 
CSR -0.03425 
(0.0249) 
-0.11305 
(0.1178)  
-0.00287* 
(0.00159) 
-0.00397 
(0.00729)  
-0.00334* 
(0.00187) 
-0.00505 
(0.00886) 
D_SIN *CSR 
 
0.092087 
(0.12)   
0.001295 
(0.00748)   
0.001995 
(0.00907) 
Size -0.04689 
(0.0464) 
-0.04617 
(0.0464)  
-0.00906*** 
(0.00248) 
-0.00905*** 
(0.00248)  
-0.00869*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.00867*** 
(0.0032) 
Age  -0.03093 
(0.0773) 
-0.02943 
(0.0773)  
-0.00683* 
(0.00408) 
-0.00681* 
(0.00407)  
-0.0074 
(0.00514) 
-0.00737 
(0.00513) 
Debt ratio 1.765672*** 
(0.2766) 
1.772563*** 
(0.276)  
0.090699*** 
(0.0185) 
0.090796*** 
(0.0183)  
0.117897*** 
(0.0213) 
0.118046*** 
(0.0212) 
CapxR 0.432041 
(0.803) 
0.484158 
(0.8004)  
-0.00943 
(0.0351) 
-0.0087 
(0.0353)  
-0.00507 
(0.0436) 
-0.00394 
(0.0439) 
ROA -1.38042** 
(0.5557) 
-1.39902** 
(0.5517)  
-0.05711** 
(0.0287) 
-0.05737** 
(0.0284)  
-0.07011* 
(0.0358) 
-0.07051** 
(0.0355) 
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CashR 1.450414** 
(0.6547) 
1.444084** 
(0.6556)  
0.070771** 
(0.0323) 
0.070682** 
(0.0324)  
0.09554** 
(0.0424) 
0.095403** 
(0.0424) 
Tobin's Q -0.07547 
(0.0705) 
-0.07519 
(0.0699)  
-0.00712** 
(0.00313) 
-0.00712** 
(0.00313)  
-0.00931** 
(0.00382) 
-0.0093** 
(0.00382) 
Altman Z 0.0606*** 
(0.0224) 
0.060954*** 
(0.0224)  
0.002571* 
(0.00138) 
0.002576* 
(0.00137)  
0.00378** 
(0.00161) 
0.003787** 
(0.00161) 
_Cons 1.279975** 
(0.4954) 
1.25887** 
(0.4943)  
0.18501*** 
(0.0296) 
0.184713*** 
(0.0295)  
0.193612*** 
(0.0356) 
0.193155*** 
(0.0355) 
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.427*** 0.4288***  0.4518*** 0.4519***  0.4531*** 0.4533*** 
Obs 495 495   495 495   495 495 
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Tables 5.15 to 5.18 report the estimation of equation (5.1) for alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and the 
sample of all SINs, respectively, using panel regression with fixed effects. The results for the 
alcohol group (table 5.15) show that if only CSR is added to the models of each risk measure (all 
columns labelled (1)), the market risk and total risk can be significantly reduced at a 5% level of 
significance. This is consistent with the risk-reduction role of CSR (Lee and Faff, 2009; Chen, 
Hung, and Lee, 2018; Monti, et al., 2019). To determine if the alcohol category changes risk 
sensitivity to CSR, we add the interaction term D-alcohol*CSR. With the addition of this term, the 
CSR variable is not significant for any risk measure and the interaction term is only significant 
(negative and significant at 5%) for IVOL (-0.00587). This suggests that CSR benefits alcohol 
firms by reducing IVOL relative to their non-SIN matches, which supports hypothesis H2b. On 
the other hand, the outcomes are not consistent with hypotheses H2a and H2c for alcohol stocks. 
Also, with the addition of the interaction term, the alcohol dummy is still significant and negative 
for IVOL (-0.00954) and TVOL (-0.0117) and remains insignificant for beta. These results 
continue to back our earlier findings that SIN stocks are not riskier than non-SIN stocks. 
The estimates for the tobacco and matched non-SIN firms (table 5.16) show that CSR reduces risk 
for beta (-0.1561, significant at 1%) and TVOL (-0.00557, significant at 10%) but has an 
insignificant impact on IVOL. However, the estimate for TVOL is not economically significant. 
For beta, the interaction coefficient is 0.1547 and significant at 1%. This tells us that the impact of 
CSR on beta for a tobacco firm is less than for its non-SIN match. Similarly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term for TVOL is 0.0077 and significant at 5%, suggesting that CSR affects total risk 
in a tobacco firm less than its non-SIN match. In other words, CSR is less effective in mitigating 
beta and total risk for tobacco firms. This finding is consistent with World Health Organization 
(2004), which states that “The CSR of the tobacco industry is an inherent contradiction, as 
industry’s core functions are in conflict with the goals of public health policies with respect to 
tobacco control”. There are other studies that show CSR cannot help, and in fact irritates, 
stakeholders in some industries as it is seen as whitewashing (Hill, 2001; Palazzo and Richard, 
2005). Thus, these findings do not support hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c for tobacco stocks. 
Further, including CSR does not change our earlier outcomes that tobacco risk is, in general, not 
greater than the risk of its non-SIN matched sample.  
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CSR does not mitigate risk for the gambling group (table 5.17) and none of the interaction terms 
are significant. Other studies also find the impact of CSR on risk is industry specific (Dowling, 
2004). Gambling investor indifference toward corporate socially responsible actions perhaps also 
reflects the more lenient investor attitudes toward gambling. 
Finally, we find that being categorized as a SIN company does not impact the sensitivity of any 
risk measure to CSR, and CSR does not reduce (or increase) risk for the sample of all SINs (table 
5.18, columns (2)). Thus, hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c and H1a, H1b and H1c are not supported 
for the sample of all SINs.   
In general, we find that the role of CSR in mitigating the risk of SIN versus non-SIN stocks is 
category sensitive. This is consistent with the premise that CSR-risk potency varies across 
industries (Dowling, 2004; Jo and Na, 2012). CSR reduces idiosyncratic risk for alcohol firms but 
increases total risk in tobacco stocks. Further, the impact of CSR on systematic risk and total risk 
for a tobacco firm is less than for its non-SIN match, while CSR has no impact on the risks of the 
gambling group and the all SINs sample. Our results contradict Jo and Na (2012) for total risk in 
SIN stocks and Guillamón-Saorín et al. (2018) for market risk (beta) in SIN stocks. 
Further, after controlling for CSR, our findings continue to confirm that alcohol and tobacco stocks 
are not riskier and often less risky than their non-SIN counterparts. Similarly, gambling stocks still 
do not display any significant difference in risk measures relative to conventional stocks. Thus, 
our results continue to contradict the premise of Hong and Kacperczyck (2009), Cai et al. (2012), 
Jo and Na (2012), Oh et al. (2017), and Guillamón-Saorín et al. (2018) that SIN companies are 
riskier than non-SIN firms.
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CHAPTER 6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We conducted propensity score matching on the three variables with the highest overlap between 
SIN and non-SIN (size, age, and the debt ratio), because matching is done more tightly with fewer 
controls. To check the sensitivity of our results to this matched sample, we match the SIN samples 
with non-SIN groups using the full set of controls in our research, except for the Altman Z score. 
In other words, the propensity scores are estimated for SIN and non-SIN stocks using logistic 
regression of one of the SIN dummy variables on size, age, debt ratio, Tobin’s Q, cash and short-
term investments ratio, capital expenditure ratio, and ROA. We drop Altman Z score from the 
regression, as there is little overlap between SIN and non-SIN stocks for this variable. 
Table (6.1) represents the mean difference of SIN stocks and conventional stocks for all control 
variables in the logistic models before and after matching. A good match should balance the 
distribution of control variables between the treated and the untreated group. For tobacco and 
gambling stocks, there are statistically significant differences in all the control variables between 
SIN and non-SIN stocks before matching, while the differences are insignificant after matching, 
suggesting tobacco and gambling stocks have the same characteristics with their non-SIN 
counterparts except for the treatment. For the alcohol sample, except for age and the cash ratio, the 
differences shift from significant to insignificant as we move from an unmatched to a matched 
sample and the differences are not significant in either scenario for CapxR and Tobin’s Q. 
Similarly, for the all SIN sample, most of the control variables are balanced between SIN and non-
SIN stocks, which ensures the isolation of the treatment effect and thus a more robust investigation 
into the impact of SIN versus non-SIN on risk.
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Table 6.1 Propensity Score Matching, t-test on the differences of control variables 
Table 6.1 shows the t-test on the differences of all control variables, including Size, Age, Debt ratio, CapxR, ROA, CashR, and Tobin’s 
Q before and after Propensity Score Matching over the period of 1980-2017. The results are presented in four sections: alcohol stocks, 
tobacco stocks, gambling stocks, and the sample of all SIN stocks. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
Alcohol 
Size  Age  Debt ratio  CapxR 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 6.2567 6.2452  2.8995 2.8952  0.2292 0.2307  0.0558 0.0558 
Control 5.2041 6.4607  2.717 3.0015  0.2083 0.217  0.056 0.0568 
Difference 1.0526*** -0.2155  0.1826*** -0.1062**  0.0209*** 0.0137  -0.000205 -0.001 
S.E 2.0779 2.4428  0.6859 0.8367  0.181 0.1641  0.0591 0.0504 
P-value <.0001 0.1716   <.0001 0.0492   0.0046 0.1952   0.9252 0.7603 
Tobacco 
Size  Age  Debt ratio  CapxR 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 8.2522 8.3541  3.8315 3.7132  0.285 0.2947  0.0346 0.0325 
Control 5.2041 7.8888  2.717 3.697  0.2083 0.2736  0.056 0.0395 
Difference 3.048*** 0.4653  1.1146*** 0.0162  0.0767*** 0.0211  -0.0215*** -0.00703 
S.E 2.0762 2.2813  0.6849 0.8119  0.1811 0.1532  0.0591 0.0295 
P-value <.0001 0.2167   <.0001 0.9034   <.0001 0.4036   <.0001 0.1497 
Gambling 
Size  Age  Debt ratio  CapxR 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 5.9434 5.9877  2.4077 2.42  0.4041 0.404  0.0927 0.093 
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Control 5.2041 5.8992  2.717 2.395  0.2083 0.4074  0.056 0.0871 
Difference 0.7393*** 0.0885  -0.3093*** 0.025  0.1958*** -0.0034  0.0367*** 0.0059 
S.E 2.075 1.9564  0.684 0.6047  0.1816 0.2413  0.0594 0.1076 
P-value <.0001 0.4367   <.0001 0.4781   <.0001 0.8071   <.0001 0.3386 
All SINs 
Size  Age  Debt ratio  CapxR 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 6.2756 6.2953  2.7327 2.7459  0.3232 0.3216  0.0724 0.0717 
Control 5.2041 6.2726  2.717 2.7559  0.2083 0.3275  0.056 0.0714 
Difference 1.0715*** 0.0227  0.0158 -0.01  0.1149*** -0.00583  0.0164*** 0.0004 
S.E 2.0787 2.2539  0.6874 0.8003  0.1817 0.2223  0.0594 0.0812 
P-value <.0001 0.8069   0.5246 0.7609   <.0001 0.5242   <.0001 0.9098 
8
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Table 6.1 (Continued). Propensity Score Matching, t-test on the differences of control variables 
Table 6.1 shows the t-test on the differences of all control variables, including Size, Age, Debt ratio, CapxR, ROA, CashR, and Tobin’s 
Q before and after Propensity Score Matching over the period of 1980-2017. The results are presented in four sections: alcohol stocks, 
tobacco stocks, gambling stocks, and the sample of all SIN stocks. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
Alcohol 
ROA  CashR  Tobin's Q 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 0.1175 0.1166  0.1064 0.1058  1.766 1.7612 
Control 0.0935 0.1072  0.1542 0.1303  1.771 1.7104 
Difference 0.024*** 0.0094  -0.0478*** -0.0246**  -0.00498 0.0508 
S.E 0.1759 0.1416  0.1781 0.1729  1.5766 1.1675 
P-value <.0001 0.3035   <.0001 0.0279   0.9237 0.5001 
Tobacco 
ROA  CashR  Tobin's Q 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 0.2767 0.1962  0.0779 0.0713  2.6819 1.9015 
Control 0.0935 0.2357  0.1542 0.0691  1.771 1.8595 
Difference 0.1832*** -0.0395  -0.0763*** 0.00228  0.9109*** 0.042 
S.E 0.1763 0.1806  0.178 0.0744  1.5797 1.1187 
P-value <.0001 0.1859   <.0001 0.8524   <.0001 0.8196 
Gambling 
ROA  CashR  Tobin's Q 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 0.1179 0.1152  0.1259 0.1276  1.603 1.5995 
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Control 0.0935 0.1087  0.1542 0.1351  1.771 1.6431 
Difference 0.0244*** 0.0065  -0.0283*** -0.0075  -0.168*** -0.0436 
S.E 0.1758 0.1236  0.1777 0.1496  1.5763 1.1982 
P-value <.0001 0.3664   <.0001 0.3911   <.0001 0.532 
All SINs 
ROA  CashR  Tobin's Q 
Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match   Unmatched Match 
Treated 0.1319 0.1307  0.1137 0.1142  1.7649 1.76 
Control 0.0935 0.119  0.1542 0.1257  1.771 1.7811 
Difference 0.0384*** 0.0116**  -0.0405*** -0.0114*  -0.00608 -0.0211 
S.E 0.1757 0.1216  0.1776 0.1549  1.5754 2.1369 
P-value <.0001 0.0202   <.0001 0.0735   0.8737 0.8105 
8
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Table 6.2 Propensity Score Matching, t-test on the differences of risk measures 
Table 6.2 exhibits the test of differences in the mean of Beta, IVOL, and TVOL between matched samples over the period of 1980-
2017. The results are presented in four sections: alcohol stocks, tobacco stocks, gambling stocks, and the sample of all SIN stocks. ***, 
**, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Alcohol Obs Mean Difference (Alcohol- non) P-value of diff 
Beta (Alcohol) 481 0.8042 -0.3396*** <.0001 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.1498   
IVOL (Alcohol) 481 0.0992 -0.0233*** <.0001 
IVOL (non-SIN)  0.1175   
TVOL (Alcohol) 481 0.1079 -0.0464*** <.0001 
TVOL(non-SIN)    0.1313     
Tobacco Obs Mean Difference (Tobacco - non) P-value of diff 
Beta (Tobacco) 74 0.6514 -0.4007*** 0.0014 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.0521   
IVOL (Tobacco) 74 0.0739 -0.0131* 0.0831 
IVOL (non-SIN)  0.087   
TVOL (Tobacco) 74 0.0813 -0.0204*** 0.0075 
TVOL (non-SIN)   0.1017     
Gambling Obs Mean Difference (Gambling - non) P-value of diff 
Beta (Gambling) 591 1.1895 -0.0587 0.231 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.2482   
IVOL (Gambling) 591 0.1454 0.00079 0.841 
IVOL (non-SIN)  0.1446   
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TVOL (Gambling) 591 0.1572 -0.00124 0.7601 
TVOL (non-SIN)   0.1584     
All SINs (Alcohol,Tobacco, Gambling) Obs Mean Difference (SIN - non) P-value of diff 
Beta (SIN) 1178 0.9824 -0.1784*** <.0001 
Beta (non-SIN)  1.1608   
IVOL (SIN) 1178 0.1199 -0.0061** 0.0202 
IVOL (non-SIN)   0.126   
TVOL (SIN) 1178 0.1301 -0.00898*** 0.0009 
TVOL (non-SIN)   0.1391     
8
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Table (6.2) demonstrates that the mean risk measures for alcohol are always statistically 
significantly less than for its matched non-SIN sample using the difference in means t-test. For 
example, the difference in the mean beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk are respectively 0.3396, 
0.0233 and 0.0464 less than those of non-SIN stocks, with all differences significant at all levels. 
Similarly, tobacco stocks have 0.4007 less mean beta than that of its non-SIN peers, 0.0131 less 
mean idiosyncratic (significant at 10%) and 0.0204 less mean total volatility (significant at 1%). 
There are no significant differences for gambling stocks and its matched non-SIN sample. When 
the triumvirate of SIN stocks are taken together, the difference in the mean beta for matched pairs 
is -0.1784 and significant at 1%. The differences are also negative and significant for IVOL and 
TVOL but with smaller magnitudes. We also conducted fixed effects panel regression on the eight 
control matched samples (table 6.3). The results are similar to the regression analysis on the 
matched sample using PSM on three controls (age, size and debt) except gambling now has an 
insignificant impact on IVOL. We can conclude that alcohol and tobacco stocks are generally less 
risky, while gambling stocks have the same level of risks with conventional stocks, on average. 
This is contrary to the premise in the literature that SIN stocks are risker than non-SIN stocks 
(Hong and Kacperczyck, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; Oh et al., 2017). Thus, the results 
do not support hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c and we are confident that they are robust to PSM. 
Finally, we consider the dividend yield (dividend payout per share price) as a potential explanatory 
variable for risk and add it to the set of controls. We do not expect this to impact our outcomes 
because dividend payout is theoretically and empirically related to several of the existing control 
variables, especially cash holdings (CashR). Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) assert that cash 
holdings and dividend policy share the same determinants, and find that size, debt ratio, and 
profitability ratio can explain dividend policy. Also, Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) conclude that 
dividend payments are positively associated with cash holdings. They state that dividend paying 
firms are concerned with reducing or omitting the dividend and therefore they tend to hold more 
cash. As a robustness check, we include dividend yield in our analyses. The multivariate regression 
results show a significant impact of dividend yield on risk if CashR, size and ROA are excluded 
but an insignificant impact otherwise. In either case, the implications for our three risk measures 
and four SIN categories are unchanged: SIN stocks are not risker than non-Sin stocks. Propensity 
score matching is problematic when we add dividend yield to the other seven controls in our 
logistic models. However, by excluding size, ROA, and CashR, matching is done properly, and, 
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most importantly, the conclusions are the same: Alcohol and tobacco are less risky, and gambling 
has the same risk as its non-SIN matches.  Therefore, we believe that our set of controls capture 
the impact of dividend yield on the risk of SIN versus non-SIN matched samples.
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Table 6.3 Panel regression analysis on matched sample of different SIN groups 
Table 6.3 presents the panel regression analysis with Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation robust standard errors on the matched samples 
from Propensity Score Matching on eight control variables over the period 1980-2017. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance 
level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 Market Beta  Idiosyncratic volatility  Total volatility 
  
(1) 
Alcohol 
(2) 
Tobacco 
(3) 
Gambling 
(1) 
Alcohol 
(2) 
Tobacco 
(3) 
Gambling 
(1) 
Alcohol 
(2) 
Tobacco 
(3) 
Gambling 
D_SIN -0.2913*** 
(0.0666) 
-0.2755** 
(0.1108) 
0.0210 
(0.126) 
 -0.0196*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.00049 
(0.00661) 
0.002851 
(0.00789) 
 -0.0249*** 
(0.00594) 
0.00547 
(0.00692) 
0.001942 
(0.00871) 
Size 0.003781 
(0.0209) 
-0.04327 
(0.0374) 
0.14435*** 
(0.0264) 
 -0.0116*** 
(0.00193) 
-0.00681** 
(0.00279) 
-0.0089*** 
(0.0021) 
 -0.0111*** 
(0.00202) 
-0.00625** 
(0.00279) 
-0.00631*** 
(0.00231) 
Age  -0.00331 
(0.058) 
-0.0072 
(0.0512) 
-0.14361* 
(0.0816) 
 -0.00261 
(0.00409) 
0.001329 
(0.00404) 
-0.01605*** 
(0.00502) 
 -0.0024 
(0.00435) 
-0.00184 
(0.00413) 
-0.01784*** 
(0.00533) 
Debt ratio -0.33243 
(0.2218) 
0.367957 
(0.5539) 
0.271406 
(0.1695) 
 -0.01206 
(0.014) 
-0.06191** 
(0.0303) 
0.06555*** 
(0.0131) 
 -0.01688 
(0.015) 
-0.03248 
(0.029) 
0.067408*** 
(0.0133) 
CapxR 0.520946 
(0.6591) 
1.99198** 
(0.9319) 
0.057601 
(0.408) 
 0.052441 
(0.044) 
-0.3140*** 
(0.0964) 
-0.02578 
(0.021) 
 0.051896 
(0.0464) 
-0.24236*** 
(0.0911) 
-0.02805 
(0.0205) 
ROA -0.5501 
(0.3871) 
-1.43655** 
(0.5694) 
-0.33367 
(0.3902) 
 -0.1458*** 
(0.0384) 
0.032434 
(0.0599) 
-0.1714*** 
(0.0241) 
 -0.1489*** 
(0.0388) 
0.009549 
(0.0522) 
-0.17276*** 
(0.0249) 
cashR 0.410772 
(0.3504) 
-0.15122 
(0.603) 
-0.12169 
(0.369) 
 -0.00131 
(0.0196) 
-0.05586 
(0.0569) 
0.06974*** 
(0.0253) 
 -0.0012 
(0.0227) 
-0.05087 
(0.0578) 
0.06831** 
(0.0267) 
Tobin's Q 0.002962 
(0.0293) 
0.080407 
(0.0927) 
0.113105** 
(0.047) 
 0.001147 
(0.00227) 
-0.00234 
(0.00648) 
0.004268** 
(0.00208) 
 0.001112 
(0.00235) 
-0.00288 
(0.00653) 
0.005943*** 
(0.00212) 
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Altman Z -0.00647 
(0.00493) 
0.06689* 
(0.0386) 
0.00084*** 
(0.000276) 
 -0.00035 
(0.000254) 
-0.0061** 
(0.0024) 
0.000032* 
(0.000018) 
 -0.00046 
(0.000297) 
-0.0033 
(0.00229) 
0.000042** 
(0.000018) 
_Cons 0.99737*** 
(0.2193) 
0.421937 
(0.5052) 
-0.07039 
(0.3485) 
 0.22074*** 
(0.0171) 
0.17983*** 
(0.0338) 
0.18127*** 
(0.0234) 
 0.22630*** 
(0.0177) 
0.17111*** 
(0.0327) 
0.170492*** 
(0.0246) 
Year fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
P-value F-test 
for no Fixed 
0.016 <.0001 <.0001  0.0245 <.0001 <.0001  0.0088 <.0001 <.0001 
R-squared 0.1879 0.3808 0.3224  0.5842 0.4103 0.4317  0.5465 0.4212 0.4062 
Obs 515 122 762   515 122 762   515 122 762 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
The goal of this research is to investigate the risk of SIN stocks. We use systematic (beta), 
idiosyncratic, and total risk to compare SIN stocks to their non-SIN peers. We focus on alcohol, 
tobacco, and gambling securities and avoid grey stocks (ambiguous sin classification) in both the 
sin and non-SIN samples. Three different methodologies are used: First, we separately regress 
each risk measure on dummies for alcohol, tobacco and gambling stocks and a set of controls. 
Second, we utilize propensity score matching to find a group of non-SIN companies that match 
the SIN categories on three criteria (size, age, and the debt ratio). This allows us to more carefully 
isolate the role of SIN versus non-SIN on risk. After forming the matched pairs, we do t-tests on 
the mean difference of the risk measures between matched samples. Third, we run a regression on 
the matched samples from propensity score matching, including SIN dummies and all controls. 
We repeat each approach for the aggregated sample of all SINs. Our results show that the collective 
triumvirate ALL sin, alcohol, tobacco and gambling stocks have significantly less, or no 
significance difference, in beta, idiosyncratic and total volatility compared to their non-SIN pairs 
with one (weak) exception: Gambling has a significant impact (.02, significant at 10%) on IVOL. 
However, the significant impact of gambling on IVOL disappears when we include all eight 
control variables.  This contrasts with the widely held premise in the SIN stock literature that SIN 
stocks are riskier (Hong and Kacperczyck, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Jo and Na 2012; Oh et al., 2017; 
and Guillamón-Saorín et al., 2018).  
Our contributions to the literature are numerous and supported by a variety of factors. In contrast 
to the existing literature, we explicitly quantified and investigated risk instead of simply assuming 
SIN risk exceeds the risk of non-SIN firms. Further, unlike the current studies, we analyzed each 
SIN category separately as well as collectively. In addition, we made a careful selection of the SIN 
and non-SIN samples by excluding so-called grey stocks from both samples. We also study an 
extended period and include a broad set of controls. To allow for period sensitivity, we split our 
original sample period into two intervals: 1980-1998 and 1999-2017. The outcomes show that the 
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risk of SIN stocks has declined over time and depends on the SIN category. Alcohol has less 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic volatility, and total volatility relative to their non-SIN counterparts, 
regardless of time period, while tobacco stocks have reduced beta and total risk but increased 
idiosyncratic risk over time. On the other hand, gambling stocks are riskier than their matched 
non-SIN sample from 1980-1998 but have the same risk with non-SIN from 1999-2017. 
For robustness, we repeat the propensity score matching using all control variables (except Altman 
Z score) and conduct t-tests on the matched samples. In general, regardless of the controls used in 
matching, the SIN sample has less risk regardless of risk measure. However, gambling stocks do 
not differ from their non-SIN matches, across the three risk measures. 
We examine the impact of CSR on risk and find that the role of CSR in mitigating the risk of SIN 
versus non-SIN stocks is category sensitive. CSR reduces idiosyncratic risk for alcohol firms but 
increases beta and total risk for tobacco stocks. Also, CSR has no impact on the risks of the 
gambling group and the all SINs sample. Our CSR model findings also verify that alcohol and 
tobacco stocks are generally less risky, while gambling stocks do not differ from non-SIN stocks.  
Our results have practical implications for investors’ stock selection and attitudes toward SIN 
stocks. The existing literature states that SIN stocks usually earn higher risk-adjusted returns. 
However, by disaggregating into SIN components, we show that only the tobacco group has 
significantly higher risk-adjusted performance. In addition, our results demonstrate that SIN 
stocks, specifically alcohol and tobacco stocks, are less risky than their non-SIN counterparts. This 
implies that, if an investor is not concerned about social norms, tobacco stocks are good candidates 
to be placed in the investor’s portfolio, as they can make higher risk-adjusted returns and have less 
risk relative to conventional stocks. Further, we find that alcohol and tobacco stocks have a 
defensive nature and therefore they could be good investment choices in recessions.  
Another implication of our work is the possibility of a changing attitude toward SIN stocks. We 
found that SIN stocks have generally become less risky with time and this may reflect a shift in 
the way North Americans view vice investing. Accordingly, further research can investigate how 
social norms and different investors’ perceptions are changing. This will require development of 
an appropriate metric to measure investor perception (attitude) toward SIN groups. In addition, the 
definitions of SIN companies might differ across various cultures (Waller, Fam, and Erdogan, 
2005). For example, people in different North American states might have dissimilar opinions 
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about the constituents of vice stocks. Another possibility for future study is to expand the domain 
of the current research to different regions (Europe, Africa, and Asia) to explore the riskiness of 
SIN stocks worldwide. Finally, additional risk measures, such as downside risk, can be added to 
increase our understanding of the impact of SIN on risk. 
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